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INTRODUCTION
In January 2015, the Meitiv children, ages ten and six, were
permitted to do a short walk on their own, from the neighborhood
playground back to their home in Silver Spring, Maryland. 1 Their
parents designed this exercise to help the children develop some
independence and self-sufficiency, and did so only after the children
had completed other smaller challenges to prepare them for this one. 2
But the parenting lesson was quickly disrupted when someone saw the
children walking alone and reported it to the police. 3 The children were
picked up by police, the father was threatened with removal of the
children from his custody, and the State of Maryland commenced an
abuse and neglect investigation. 4 The Meitivs identify their approach as

1 Donna St. George, Parents Investigated for Neglect After Letting Kids Walk Home Alone,
WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/marylandcouple-want-free-range-kids-but-not-all-do/2015/01/14/d406c0be-9c0f-11e4-bcfb059ec7a93ddc_story.html.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. (“[A] CPS worker required [Mr. Meitiv] to sign a safety plan pledging he would not
leave his children unsupervised until the following Monday, when CPS would follow up. At
first he refused, saying he needed to talk to a lawyer, his wife said, but changed his mind when
he was told his children would be removed if he did not comply.”).
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“‘free-range’ parenting,” 5 a child-rearing philosophy that is a conscious
reaction to and rejection of the recent trend toward “helicopter”
parenting. 6 But the caller and the police apparently felt that the Meitivs
were exposing their children to unacceptable levels of danger. 7
At the core of the conflict is the ongoing debate about what
constitutes responsible parenting in a world increasingly obsessed with
child safety. While statistics show that children are dramatically safer
today than ever before, 8 media sensationalization of stranger abduction
cases, and other potential dangers in the world, are prompting parents
to err on the side of overprotection. 9 There is mounting evidence that
such overprotection does more harm than good, 10 but parents, like the
Meitivs, who resist the hyper-parenting trend, are running afoul of the
legal system.
The Meitivs’ story is not an isolated one. Recent news items include
other examples of parents arrested—or otherwise subjected to state
intervention through the state’s Child Protective Services (CPS)
agency—for allowing their children to play in neighborhood parks, 11 or
to walk to or from school, 12 or stay home alone, 13 without continuous
Id.
LENORE SKENAZY, FREE-RANGE KIDS: HOW TO RAISE SAFE, SELF-RELIANT CHILDREN
(2010). The term “helicopter parents” refers to parents “who hover over-protectively around
their children.” Elizabeth G. Porter, Tort Liability in the Age of the Helicopter Parent, 64 ALA. L.
REV. 533, 536 (2013).
7 St. George, supra note 1.
8 BRYAN CAPLAN, SELFISH REASONS TO HAVE MORE KIDS: WHY BEING A GREAT PARENT IS
LESS WORK AND MORE FUN THAN YOU THINK 96 (2011) (“Conditions today aren’t merely
better [than they were in the 1950s]. They improved so much that government statisticians
changed their denominator [for youth mortality] from deaths per 1,000 to deaths per
100,000.”).
9 David Pimentel, Criminal Child Neglect and the “Free Range Kid”: Is Overprotective
Parenting the New Standard of Care?, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 947, 963–66 (2012).
10 Gaia Bernstein & Zvi Triger, Over-Parenting, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1274–78
(2011). Professors Bernstein and Triger have outlined numerous psychological effects that
Intensive Parenting has on the first generation of intensively parented children. Id. These
negative effects include dependency and inability to cope with life’s challenges; inability “to
manage their time, strategize, and negotiate open conflict during play”; decreased “creativity,
spontaneity, [and] enjoyment . . . than children raised under different child rearing practices”;
decreased empathy; and immaturity. Id. at 1275–76. If the law forces parents to subscribe to
Intensive Parenting norms, it may undermine the critical role of parents to instill in their
children a sense of independence and the ability to successfully separate from their parents. Id.
at 1274; Hara Estroff Marano, A Nation of Wimps, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Nov. 1, 2004), https://
www.psychologytoday.com/articles/200411/nation-wimps. “Harvard psychologist Jerome
Kagan has shown unequivocally that what creates anxious children is parents hovering and
protecting them from stressful experiences.” Id.; see also L.J. Jackson, Smothering Mothering:
‘Helicopter Parents’ Are Landing Big in Child Care Cases, 96 A.B.A. J. 18, 18–19 (2010)
(referencing “the psychological harm that overprotection may lead to in child rearing”).
11 E.g., Conor Friedersdorf, Working Mom Arrested for Letting Her 9-Year-Old Play Alone
at Park, ATLANTIC (July 15, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/07/
arrested-for-letting-a-9-year-old-play-at-the-park-alone/374436.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 111–12 (discussing the Jonesboro, Arkansas case).
5
6
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parental supervision. The spate of news items suggests a trend toward
enhanced, arguably invasive, scrutiny of parents, with the state secondguessing the parenting decisions they make, and intervening whenever
they disagree with the parents’ judgment call.
The interventions are a problem not just for parents who have
affirmatively chosen a “free range” approach to child-rearing. The
degree of supervision demanded by these new highly protective
parenting norms are simply beyond the reach of many families less
privileged than the Meitivs. Single parents in low-paying jobs cannot
afford nannies to do the helicoptering for them. 14 Children in large
families—the larger family sizes correlating strongly with non-white
ethnicities 15—cannot expect to get the same level of individualized
parental attention that upper-middle class white America now deems to
be standard. 16

13 Leah Barkoukis, Children Taken from Parents for a Month for Waiting Alone in
Backyard, TOWNHALL.COM (June 9, 2015, 6:04 PM), http://townhall.com/tipsheet/
leahbarkoukis/2015/06/09/parental-rights-vs-government-boy-11-plays-basketball-in-ownyard-as-he-awaits-delayed-parents-cops-take-him--brother-away-for-a-month-n2010171;
Lenore Skenazy, 11-Year-Old Boy Played in His Yard. CPS Took Him, Felony Charge for
Parents, REASON: HIT & RUN BLOG (June 11, 2015, 11:35 AM), https://reason.com/blog/2015/
06/11/11-year-old-boy-played-in-his-yard-cps-t.
14 Shanesha Taylor attracted national attention when she, attempting to find work to
support her two young children, left them in the car while she interviewed for a job. “To many
she represented the plight of single and underemployed parents who face tough decisions each
day related to child care.” Emanuella Grinberg, When Justice is ‘Merciful’ in Child Abuse Cases,
CNN (Aug. 7, 2014, 1:33 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/07/living/shanesha-taylor-pleadeal.
15 Family Size, By Race and Ethnicity, PEW RES. CTR. (May 7, 2015), http://
www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/05/07/childlessness-falls-family-size-grows-among-highlyeducated-women/st_2015-05-07_childlessness-12 (showing that Hispanic women, ages forty to
forty-four, are nearly twice as likely as white women to have four or more children (in 1994,
28% of Hispanic women aged forty to forty-four had four or more kids, and in 2014, that
number was still at 20%, while only 11% of white women aged forty to forty-four had that
many kids over that same twenty-year span)).
16 WASH. RISK ASSESSMENT PROJECT, MULTI-CULTURAL GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSING
FAMILY STRENGTHS AND RISK FACTORS IN CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES 35 (Peter J. Pecora &
Diana J. English eds., 1993).

Issues of lack of supervision of young children surface most frequently in referrals for
Native American and Hispanic families. Older, but still young children are expected
to care for their younger siblings. In Native American families, being responsible for
one’s siblings, is an indication of maturity and ability. In Hispanic families, especially
migrant families, caring for younger siblings may be [a] role associated with younger
children’s contribution to family survival.
Id. (citations omitted). Class is similarly correlated with levels of parental attention. Eleanor E.
Maccoby, Middle Childhood in the Context of the Family, in DEVELOPMENT DURING MIDDLE
CHILDHOOD: THE YEARS FROM SIX TO TWELVE 184, 207 (W. Andrew Collins ed., 1984) (“Major
contrasts that have emerged with some consistency are that middle-class parents, compared
with working- or lower-class parents: Have higher rates of interaction with their children and
are more responsive to their children’s bids for attention.”).
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The intrusions are made in the name of protecting children from
harm, a public policy objective that is both easy to defend and hard to
dismiss. But disruption of the family in this way—removing or even
threatening to remove kids from their families—can do tremendous
harm to children, the very children the state is trying to protect, 17 and in
many cases contravene the family’s fundamental liberty interests under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 and/or their Fourth Amendment rights
against seizure of their children. 19 Although the oft-cited “best interest
of the child” standard, discussed in more detail infra, 20 has no legal
application to interventions like that which supplanted the Meitivs’
parenting choices, it appears that those doing the intervening are
applying such a principle de facto to justify their actions. 21
Parents caught in this nightmare are well advised to cooperate
quickly, apologize profusely, and promise it won’t happen again—
effectively waiving their rights to raise their children as they see fit—in
order to avoid having their children taken away from them. 22 But unless
they assert their constitutional rights in these cases, those rights will not
be litigated or adjudicated. Indeed, it appears that in many of these
cases, those rights are being disregarded altogether.
What we need is a better conception of how the rights of parents
come into play when the state attempts to rein in free-range parents, or
any parent who does not fully implement the child-safety-obsessed
orthodoxy of twenty-first century parenting. The existing case law
suggests that the enforcement of overprotective parenting norms in
society is, at worst, a gross violation of the constitutional rights of
parents, and at best, a severe chilling of those rights. The legal system,
therefore, is taking sides in the debate over what constitutes ideal
parenting and, through individuals purporting to act in the best
interests of children, 23 is bullying parents into adhering to hyper17 See David Pimentel, Fearing the Bogeyman: How the Legal System’s Overreaction to
Perceived Danger Threatens Families and Children, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 235, 274–75 (2015).
18 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (“[I]t cannot now be doubted that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [of the U.S. Constitution] protects the
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
their children.”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
19 In re Stumbo, 582 S.E.2d 255 (N.C. 2003) (holding that an anonymous report that an
unsupervised two-year-old was naked in the driveway was insufficient to constitute “neglect”
under the state’s and county’s investigations policy, so CPS was not within its authority to effect
a Fourth Amendment seizure of the family’s children–separating them from their parents and
interviewing them in private–as part of its required investigation.).
20 See discussion infra Section I.E.
21 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 111–12 (discussing the police officer’s
explanation of his actions in the Jonesboro, Arkansas case).
22 See infra text accompanying note 92.
23 See Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966), where the Iowa Supreme Court
applied a “best interest of the child” standard to deprive a father of custody of his child, based
on the court’s own value-laden conception of what constituted a proper upbringing—turning
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protective parenting norms. Lost in that process are the constitutional
rights of parents, as well as the benefit—both to the children themselves
and to society as a whole—that comes from respecting parental dignity
and family integrity. 24
A clearer articulation of parental rights, and a more robust
assertion of those rights, is overdue. 25 Moreover, protecting the rights of
parents to parent as they see fit—safeguarding their discretion in
parenting, including issues of risk-management for their children—is
likely to do far more to advance the interests of children than the
emerging pattern of state intervention can hope to achieve. 26
This Article proceeds in six parts. First is an explanation of why
some parents choose to adopt a less-protective approach to parenting, a
decision that may be prompted by free-range parenting philosophy, by
resource constraints, or by cultural traditions. That Part also explores
why the rights of these parents go unasserted, unadjudicated, and
unenforced, as well as how the concept of the “best interest of the child”
is often misapplied in these cases.
The second Part sets forth the constitutional basis for the rights of
parents over the care, custody, and control of their children, arguing
that encroachment of such fundamental liberty interests must be
subjected to strict scrutiny.
Third, the Article explores the tension inherent in a parent’s rights
vis-à-vis the competing rights of children, of the state, and of the other
parent, in light of the fact that the parent is not typically exercising these
its nose up at the father’s “unconventional, arty, Bohemian” life, in favor of the more “stable”
and conventional environment offered by the grandparents. As a rule, a court should not apply
a “best interests of the child” standard unless and until the parent is found by a court to be
“unfit.” See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 (Justice O’Connor observed “there is a presumption that fit
parents act in the best interests of their children.”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)
(discussing unfitness). But this constitutional limit is not consistently applied, as the State of
Washington violated this principle in Troxel, more than twenty-five years after Stanley. Troxel,
530 U.S. 57.
24 MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 37, 47 (2005).
25 The British legal system presents a cautionary tale, as expanded recognition of the rights
of children has threatened to swallow up the concept of parents’ rights altogether. Noted British
scholar Alexander McCall Smith observes:
So strong has the best interest principle become that the question needs to be
addressed as to whether there is anything left of parental rights . . . . The gradual
demotion of parental rights . . . may be viewed as another example of the gradually
encroaching power of the interventionist state in the area of the bringing up of
children.
Alexander McCall Smith, Is Anything Left of Parental Rights?, in FAMILY RIGHTS: FAMILY LAW
AND MEDICAL ADVANCE 9, 18 (Elaine Sutherland & Alexander McCall Smith eds., 1990).
26 See, e.g., GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 37–38 (“Parents . . . receiving maximum
discretion to carry out their responsibilities [are] free from the worry that their behavior will be
monitored and second-guessed by a third party. Children obviously benefit from rules that are
calculated to reduce stress in their home.”).
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rights for his own benefit (and in that sense, they may not be “his”
rights), but for the benefit of another, namely his child.
The fourth Part explores how parental duties are inseparably
connected to those rights. Here, the principle of fiduciary duty offers
some insight into the roles and rights of parents to exercise their
judgment, for the benefit of another, without fear of liability or of being
second-guessed by the state.
Fifth, the Article notes that solutions to the problem of unenforced
rights may lie in the implementation of parents’ procedural rights in
these cases, most notably the right to counsel.
The sixth Part highlights the overarching problem that the system’s
failure to enforce and protect parents’ rights in these cases threatens to
chill their exercise. Fear of state intervention will force parents’ hands in
their parenting choices, undermining family autonomy as well as the
best interests of the children.
I. THE PROBLEM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS FOR FREE-RANGE PARENTS
A.

What is Free-Range Parenting?

To a large degree, free-range parenting is a reaction to the presentday obsession with child-safety, and the emerging parenting norms that
reflect those fears. Despite the fact that “stranger danger” is an irrational
fear that has been largely debunked, 27 it is widely considered unsafe to
let kids play in parks or walk to school without the constant supervision
of an adult. 28 Preteen babysitters, sandlot baseball, bike riding in the
neighborhood, and tree-climbing, once staples of childhood in America,
are now relics of history. 29 If children get outdoors at all these days, it is
27 A simple web search of “Stranger Danger Myth” draws dozens of hits. E.g., David
Finkelhor, Opinion, Five Myths About Missing Children, WASH. POST (May 10, 2013), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-missing-children/2013/05/10/efee398cb8b4-11e2-aa9e-a02b765ff0ea_story.html.
28 This preconceived notion that children are not safe without constant parental
supervision may be correlated to a study illustrating a trend that Americans today are far less
trusting of others compared to previous generations. Specifically, a study has shown that
Americans born before the 1930s were twice as trusting of others and likely to engage in
community projects, in comparison to their grandchildren. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone:
America’s Declining Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 65 (1995). See further discussion of
Putnam’s work infra text accompanying notes 31–33.
29 Dennis Cauchon, Childhood Pastimes are Increasingly Moving Indoors: Fishing, Biking
and Sports Giving Way to Video Games, USA TODAY (July 12, 2005), http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/educate/college/education/articles/20050717.htm (“The fundamental
nature of American childhood has changed in a single generation. The unstructured outdoor
childhood—days of pick-up baseball games, treehouses and ‘be home for dinner’—has all but
vanished.”).
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typically in organized sports leagues, with redundant parental
supervision, which they travel to and from in minivans or SUVs,
strapped into car seats. 30
The appeal of the “stranger danger” myth, and the obsession with
child protection, may have complex and multi-faceted roots. Robert
Putnam’s 2000 book Bowling Alone documents a profound societal shift,
describing “how we have become increasingly disconnected from
family, friends, neighbors, and our democratic structures.” 31 This
waning sense of community is another reason that people may not allow
their children out in the neighborhoods; people are less likely to know
their neighbors, much less trust them. 32 In an environment of increased
alienation and distrust, it is only natural that parents would close ranks
around their kids, sealing them off from the community that had, for
previous generations, provided some kind of informal social safety net.33
Disconnected from their communities, families are far more likely to
“go it alone,” assuming full responsibility for their children’s welfare,
rather than relying on the community as a whole to join in the
oversight, protection, and nurturing of the neighborhood’s children.34

30 Id. (“When children do go outside, it tends to be for scheduled events—soccer camp or a
fishing derby—held under the watch of adults. In a typical week, 27% of kids ages 9 to 13 play
organized baseball, but only 6% play on their own, a survey by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention found.”).
31 About the Book, BOWLING ALONE, http://bowlingalone.com (last visited Jan. 28, 2016)
(describing Robert D. Putnam’s book Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community).
32 Thomas H. Sander & Robert D. Putnam, Still Bowling Alone? The Post-9/11 Split, 21 J.
DEMOCRACY 9, 9–10 (2010).
33 Putnam speculates about the causes of this trend, including (1) the entry of women into
the workforce, (2) geographic mobility that “disrupt[s] root systems,” (3) demographic changes
(“fewer marriages, more divorces, fewer children” etc.), and (4) “the technological
transformation of leisure” including a shift from socialization toward TV watching. Putnam,
supra note 28, at 73–75. Exactly why it has happened is not particularly important to this
analysis; the fact that it has happened appears to be having an enormous effect on modern
conceptions of parenting.
34 The 1996 book It Takes a Village, by then-First Lady Hillary Clinton, took its title from
the African-attributed proverb “It takes a village to raise a child,” and promoted the idea that
responsibility for a child goes far beyond the child’s immediate family–that outside people and
groups can have great impact on a child’s life as well. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A
VILLAGE AND OTHER LESSONS CHILDREN TEACH US (1996). The message was promptly
politicized, however, when Senator and presidential candidate Bob Dole referenced it in his
acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention that year, pushing back on the
notion of community responsibility:

And after the virtual devastation of the American family, the rock upon which this
country was founded, we are told that it takes a village . . . . [W]ith all due respect, I
am here to tell you it does not take a village to raise a child. It takes a family to raise a
child.
Senator Robert Dole, Speech to the Republican National Convention (Aug. 15, 1996), http://
www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/conventions/san.diego/transcripts/0815/dole.fdch.shtml.
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This shift is also evident from the fact that neighbors, seeing young
children unattended, respond not by trying to help the kids, but by
calling the police and reporting the parents. 35
Free-range parents, in contrast, mourn the loss of freedom for
today’s kids, and argue that kids are actually far worse off because of
these “safety” measures. Today’s kids spend far more time indoors on
sedentary activities, including “screen time,” contributing to a spike in
the problem of childhood obesity, and a range of other developmental
problems. 36 Others have argued that today’s coddled kids not only lose a
sense of discovery and exploration when they are kept home and under
nonstop adult supervision, they are deprived of an opportunity to
develop self-sufficiency and or to learn to take responsibility for
themselves. 37 Infantilizing kids as they grow up, in an attempt to keep
them safe, has also contributed to problems at universities, where
undergraduate deans complain that freshmen depend on their parents
to solve their problems and navigate the system. 38
Senator Dole’s message, however, was not pushing back on neighborhood and community
support for parents and their children, but on state interventions in the family:
[W]e are told that it takes a village, that is collective, and thus the state, to raise a
child. The state is now more involved than it ever has been in the raising of children.
And children are now more neglected, more abused and more mistreated than they
have been in our time. This is not a coincidence.
Id.

35 See, e.g., Donna St. George, supra note 1 (discussing the Meitivs’ story); see also Nicole
Comstock, Sacramento Mother Faces Child Endangerment Charges for Allowing 4-Year-Old Son
to Play Outside Alone, FOX 40 (Nov. 19, 2015, 10:53 PM), http://fox40.com/2015/11/19/
sacramento-mother-faces-child-endangerment-charges-for-allowing-4-year-old-son-to-playoutside-alone (“A Sacramento mother faces jail time for letting her 4-year-old son play alone at
an outdoor playground 120 feet from her front door. ‘He was outside and the neighbor called
the cops on us,’ the boy’s mother, Sonya Hendren, said.”).
36 See, e.g., Cynthia Ogden & Margaret Carroll, Prevalence of Obesity Among Children and
Adolescents: United States, Trends 1963–1965 Through 2007–2008 (2010), CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/obesity_child_07_08/obesity_
child_07_08.pdf.; Television Watching and “Sit Time”, HARVARD T.H. CHAN SCH. OF PUB.
HEALTH: OBESITY PREVENTION SOURCE, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/obesity-preventionsource/obesity-causes/television-and-sedentary-behavior-and-obesity (“This article briefly
outlines the research on how TV viewing and other sedentary activities contribute to obesity
risk, and why reducing screen time and sedentary time are important targets for obesity
prevention.”).
37 LENORE SKENAZY, FREE-RANGE KIDS: GIVING OUR CHILDREN THE FREEDOM WE HAD
WITHOUT GOING NUTS WITH WORRY, at xx–xxi (2009); see also Bernstein & Triger, supra note
10, at 1275 (stating that the heavy monitoring involved in “Intensive Parenting” has been
shown to prevent children from developing independence, self-sufficiency, and the coping skills
needed to handle the hardships of life).
38 E.g., JULIE LYTHCOTT-HAIMS, HOW TO RAISE AN ADULT: BREAK FREE OF THE
OVERPARENTING TRAP AND PREPARE YOUR KID FOR SUCCESS 6–7 (2015) (“What will become of
young adults who look accomplished on paper but seem to have a hard time making their way
in the world without the constant involvement of their parents?”). Lythcott-Haims served as
Dean of Freshman and Undergraduate Advising at Stanford University before writing her book.
Kate Chesley, Lythcott-Haims Stepping Down as Dean of Freshmen and Undergraduate
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Yet free-range parents are coming under attack, for endangering
their children, when they refuse to hover or to coddle their kids. Much
of the problem comes from failing to appreciate the risk-management
role of parents. Anything a parent does to protect a child from one risk
is likely to increase another risk. Driving a child to school may protect
him from the nearly negligible risk of stranger abduction, but it also
subjects the child to the far more likely dangers of traveling in a motor
vehicle, of developing a sense of dependency, and of lack of exercise.
Indeed, the American Academy of Pediatrics has published statistics
suggesting that “being driven to school in a passenger vehicle is by far
the most dangerous way to get there.” 39
The Meitivs, of course, are consciously choosing to give their kids a
long leash, based on their own convictions about what is best for their
kids. Kids who are capable of fending for themselves, the theory goes,
are far safer (not to mention happier and more successful) than kids
who are sheltered from the world by the smothering safety constraints
imposed by hovering parents. 40 The latter kids are more vulnerable to
the world, and seriously at risk, the minute their parents are not present.
But the self-sufficient, free-range kid will be in a position to deal with
unanticipated difficulties in life, and navigate them without parental
hand-holding. 41
The legal issue arises only because free-range parents, like the
Meitivs, are being targeted by law enforcement authorities and by Child
Protective Services agencies. Other parents, who may not adhere to the
free-range philosophy per se, but who have engaged in more relaxed
approaches to child supervision—because of, e.g., cultural factors or
socio-economic factors—have been similarly implicated. Fueled by the
growing obsession with child safety in our society, police now appear to
be responding whenever someone who disapproves of another’s
parenting calls 911 and reports an “endangered” child. The parents are
then threatened with devastating consequences: criminal records and
jail time; having their children taken away from them (temporarily or

Advising, STANFORD NEWS (Mar. 28, 2012), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/march/
lythcott-haims-leaving-032812.html.
39 Jane E. Brody, Turning the Ride to School into a Walk, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2007), http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/09/11/health/11brod.html. “Driving your third-grader to the store is
vastly more dangerous than leaving him home without a bodyguard.” CAPLAN, supra note 8, at
29.
40 See Ramon Resa, Problems with Overprotective Parents: Why Letting Children Play in
Dirt is Healthy, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ramonresa-md/problems-with-overprotect_b_262209.html.
41 CARL HONORÉ, UNDER PRESSURE: RESCUING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE CULTURE OF
HYPER-PARENTING 248 (2009) (“Children are a lot more resilient and robust than we give them
credit for. . . . [A] few knocks along the way are unlikely to scar anyone for life; they might even
make them stronger.”).

PIMENTEL.38.1.1 (Do Not Delete)

2016]

PROTECTING THE FREE-RANGE KID

11/4/2016 5:06 PM

11

permanently); and even when charges are dropped, getting listed on
“child abuse” registries. 42
The structure of our legal system has created and exacerbated these
problems as explored in my two earlier articles. 43 Among the key points
in those articles is recognition of the fact that parenting is an exercise in
risk management. When parents act to protect their children from one
danger, they almost always subject that child to another one. Allowing a
child to walk to school unaccompanied creates some risk, however
small, of stranger abduction; but driving a child to school to insulate her
from that risk puts her in a moving vehicle, arguably the most
dangerous place for a child today. 44 Allowing children to play in the
neighborhood, ride bikes to the park, and join in outdoor games with
other neighborhood children, certainly exposes them to some risk; but
keeping them indoors where they will be “safe,” watching TV or playing
video games, certainly exposes them to a variety of other harms
including the newest epidemic of child obesity. 45 Allowing a teenager to
play high school football is certainly dangerous, 46 but given the social
advantages high school athletes enjoy, as well as the physical exercise
and the potential to keep young men busy and out of trouble, 47 a large
number of parents opt to let them play. If parents face liability for
exposing children to risk, they have lost before they begin, because the
risks cannot be eliminated, only managed, and the state appears to be all
too ready to second-guess their judgments.

42 Listing on these registries can have serious consequences for those listed. Once a person
is listed, it is typically impossible for her to get a job teaching or working with children, or
caring for the elderly or vulnerable. If presently employed in such a profession, she is likely to
be fired summarily. Also, inclusion in a registry can have devastating consequences to the
parent in child-custody disputes that may arise later. See Eric D. Lawrence, Change is on the
Way for Registry of Neglect: Some Critics Call Michigan’s Database a Permanent Blacklist,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, (Mar. 24, 2014), http://freep.newspapers.com/image/105074767. See also
infra note 95 (discussing how and when the state’s stigmatizing of individuals in this way can
trigger due process protections).
43 Pimentel, supra note 17; Pimentel, supra note 9.
44 The American Academy of Pediatrics has published statistics suggesting that “being
driven to school in a passenger vehicle is by far the most dangerous way to get there.” Brody,
supra note 39. “Driving your third-grader to the store is vastly more dangerous than leaving
him at home without a bodyguard.” CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 29.
45 Childhood Obesity Facts, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 19, 2015),
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/childhood.html; Television Watching and “Sit Time”, supra
note 36.
46 See Ken Reed, Opinion, Game Over for Concussion Debate, USA TODAY (Mar. 6, 2015,
12:26 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/03/06/youth-sports-avoidancebehavior-column/24383229.
47 RYAN HEDSTROM & DANIEL GOULD, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF YOUTH SPORTS, RESEARCH
IN YOUTH SPORTS: CRITICAL ISSUES STATUS 4–8 (2004), http://www.pysc.org/projects/
documents/ResearchinYouthSports-CriticalIssuesStatus.pdf.
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Again, these issues and problems have been addressed elsewhere,
but the constitutional rights of these parents, faced with accusations and
investigations, is a matter demanding further attention.
B.

Imperfect and Struggling Parents

The problem is not limited to those who consciously identify
themselves—like the Meitivs—as “free-range” parents. Most of the
parents who run afoul of the new parenting orthodoxy, and who endure
state intrusions into their homes and families, are just ordinary people
attempting to do something that is extraordinarily difficult, i.e., raising
young children. Parents have been faced with similar child-rearing
challenges for millennia, and it does not appear to be getting easier. In
the process, most (I daresay all) parents suffer momentary lapses of
judgment and make mistakes, prompted perhaps by exhaustion,
frustration, or limited resources (both material and emotional). 48
Human weakness, even human frailty, 49 can be forgiven in almost every
endeavor, it would appear, except parenting which, ironically, may be
the most difficult thing most people will do in their lives. 50 Put on top of
the fact that a large percentage of parents in America are doing this for
the first time, 51 and the unfairness of holding parents to standards of
48 The Supreme Court has addressed this concern in the context of parental termination
proceedings. In raising the constitutional minimum standard to clear and convincing in these
proceedings, a factor the Supreme Court considered was “the possible risk that a factfinder
might decide to [deprive] an individual based solely on a few isolated instances of unusual
conduct [or] . . . idiosyncratic behavior.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 764 (1982) (quoting
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979)).
49 In the classic film, The Philadelphia Story, the character flaw of Tracy Lord was that she
had no “regard for human frailty.” The Philadelphia Story: Comprehensive Storyform,
DRAMATICA, http://dramatica.com/analysis/the-philadelphia-story (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
Her ex-husband calls her out on it: “You’ll never be a first class human being . . . until you’ve
learned to have some regard for human frailty.” The Philidelphia Story: Quotes, IMDB, http://
www.imdb.com/title/tt0032904/quotes (last visited July 16, 2016).
50 See, e.g., Kirsten Brunner, Yes, Parenting IS the Hardest Job, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 14,
2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kirsten-brunner/yes-parenting-is-the-hardest-job_b_
5974712.html.
51

The problem may be exacerbated by demographic shifts to smaller families. It means
that inexperienced parents are raising a far greater proportion of children. When it
was common to have four children in a family, 75% of children were raised by
parents who had ‘done this before,’ raising an older sibling. When the average family
size in the United States—for families with children—drops to less than two children
per family, a majority of children in the United States will be raised by parents doing
this for the first time. And if those parents grew up in small households themselves,
the likelihood that they participated in or even witnessed the rearing of younger
siblings is dramatically diminished as well.
Pimentel, supra note 17, at 288–89 (footnotes omitted).
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perfection—where nothing less than the “best” interest of the child is
sufficient to meet legal requirements—is manifest.
The parents who are struggling—particularly single parent families
of limited means—are particularly vulnerable, as they can’t afford to be
stay-at-home parents, or to hire nannies, 52 to provide the constant
supervision now expected. Even simple matters like Shanesha Taylor’s
seeking a job, 53 Debra Harrell’s going to work, 54 or Kim Brooks’s
making a quick run into the store, 55 when they couldn’t or didn’t take
their kids with them, have generated horrific encounters with the law.
Both Taylor and Harrell were poor, single, women of color. 56 Taylor was
employed only part time, and left her kids in the car while she
interviewed for a desperately-needed job. 57 As one commentator put it,
“To many she represented the plight of single and underemployed
parents who face tough decisions each day related to child care.” 58
Harrell was employed at McDonald’s, and her nine-year-old
daughter begged to be allowed to play at the park rather than hang out
in McDonald’s during her mother’s full shift. 59 Both of these moms
faced very few options before these incidents, and even fewer options
after they had been charged with serious crimes for what amounts to
“parenting while impoverished.” 60
52 See CHILD CARE AWARE OF AM., PARENTS AND THE HIGH COST OF CHILD CARE (2014),
http://www.arizonachildcare.org/pdf/2014-child-care-cost-report.pdf; Danielle Paquette, The
Staggering Cost of Day Care When You Make Only the Minimum Wage, WASH. POST:
WONKBLOG (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/10/06/thestaggering-cost-of-daycare-when-you-make-only-the-minimum-wage.
53 See Grinberg, supra note 14 (discussing the story of Shanesha Taylor, an unemployed
mother who left her kids long enough to interview for a job, only to be arrested for leaving
them). Taylor was ultimately sentenced to eighteen years probation. Sarah Jarvis, Mom Who
Left Kids in Car Sentenced to 18 Years Probation, USA TODAY (May 15, 2015, 8:39 PM), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/05/15/shanesha-taylor-kids-in-car/27375405.
54 Debra Harrell, of South Carolina, was arrested after letting her nine-year-old play in the
park while she went to her job at McDonald’s. Friedersdorf, supra note 11.
55 Kim Brooks, The Day I Left My Son in the Car, SALON (June 3, 2014, 7:00 PM), http://
www.salon.com/2014/06/03/the_day_i_left_my_son_in_the_car (“I made a split-second
decision to run into the store. I had no idea it would consume the next years of my life.”).
56 See Friedersdorf, supra note 11; Chris Branch, An Important Conversation About the
Mom Arrested for Leaving Her Kid at A Park, HUFFINGTON POST (July 16, 2014, 5:33 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/16/single-mom-jail-child-unattended-park_n_
5592799.html; Grinberg, supra note 14. The fact that Harrell was employed at McDonald’s
supports the inference that she was low income. Branch, supra. The fact that Taylor was
employed only part time while actively seeking full-time employment supports a similar
inference. Shaila Dewan, A Job Seeker’s Desperate Choice, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2014) http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/business/a-job-seekers-desperate-choice.html?.
57 See Dewan, supra note 56; Grinberg, supra note 14.
58 Grinberg, supra note 14.
59 Friedersdorf, supra note 11.
60 See Noah Remnick, Opinion, Debra Harrell and the Mythology of Bad Black Mothers,
L.A. TIMES (July 18, 2014, 1:47 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-debraharrell-mythology-black-mothers-20140718-story.html. Commenting on Debra Harrell’s case
in particular, Remnick exposed the harsh judgments of society against poor women of color:
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In Santosky v. Kramer, which involved an attempt to terminate
parental rights, the Supreme Court echoed this very concern: “Because
parents subject to termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated,
or members of minority groups, such proceedings are often vulnerable
to judgments based on cultural or class bias.” 61
Kim Brooks’s experience was not so much related to poverty and
race as coping the pressing demands of parenting young children, which
is difficult for anyone. Attempting to meet deadlines, forestall tantrums,
and meet family needs, she “did a quick risk-benefit analysis,” and then
acceded to her four-year-old’s demand to remain in the car while she
dashed into the store “for about five minutes.”62 The desperate anxiety
of a parent in the moment—running late on a hard day—may have
clouded her judgment. 63 But parents of small children live their lives
continually in such clouds of sleep deprivation, “anxiety, confusion,
frustration, [and] depression.” 64
Unfortunately, the low-wage jobs attainable for most mothers lead to a parental
quagmire. Between low paychecks and inflexible work schedules, how is one to
arrange for adequate child care? With no apparent options, the answer is often that
they simply cannot. Such women, it’s been repeated to you, are bad mothers who
deserve to be punished, and increasingly we’re doing just that. Indeed, the mythology
of bad black mothers was never just a part of our cultural folklore—it’s entrenched in
our legal system.
Id. The absent fathers in these stories, ironically enough, escape liability and blame because they
have successfully foisted responsibility for the children on their mother. The mothers who are
trying to do everything get blamed, and sometimes prosecuted, because they can’t do
everything. The father, who does absolutely nothing, stands in the clear.
61 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982) (citation omitted).
62 Brooks, supra note 55. In her words,
[My 4-year-old] glanced up at me, his eyes alight with what I’d come to recognize as
a sort of pre-tantrum agitation. “No, no, no, no, no! I don’t want to go in,” he
repeated, and turned back to his game.
I took a deep breath. I looked at the clock. For the next four or five seconds, I did
what it sometimes seems I’ve been doing every minute of every day since having
children, a constant, never-ending risk-benefit analysis. I noted that it was a mild,
overcast, 50-degree day. I noted how close the parking spot was to the front door,
and that there were a few other cars nearby. I visualized how quickly, unencumbered
by a tantrumming 4-year-old, I would be, running into the store, grabbing a pair of
child headphones. And then I did something I’d never done before. I left him. I told
him I’d be right back. I cracked the windows and child-locked the doors and doubleclicked my keys so that the car alarm was set. And then I left him in the car for about
five minutes.
Id.

63 As she describes the circumstances, however, it is difficult to identify any significant risk
that she exposed her child to: (1) not abduction, as the child was secured in a locked and
alarmed car, (2) not heat, as the day was cool, the windows cracked, and the time in the car
limited to “about five minutes.” Id.
64 Alice G. Walton, How to Enjoy the Often Exhausting, Depressing Role of Parenthood,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/01/how-to-enjoythe-often-exhausting-depressing-role-of-parenthood/250901.
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Accordingly, the issues of the rights of parents are not limited to
the privileged few, who choose to indulge in free-range parenting as a
favored approach to child-rearing. Any parent, facing the burdens and
challenges that come with caring for children, will have a bad day, and
will make a poor judgment call; he or she deserves some slack. And the
rights of parents become, perhaps, most compelling in the case of the
struggling parent who is desperately trying to hold her family together
and for whom free-range parenting is not so much a conscious choice as
a last resort.
C.

Families from Other Cultural Traditions

Enforcement of the new child-safety obsessed orthodoxy threatens
not only those who are less advantaged socio-economically, it is also an
attack on cultural and religious pluralism in America. Parenting
methods and philosophies typically reflect the values of the family—
their faith and traditions—which may or may not align with modern
parenting trends.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court recognized the cultural
and religious foundation for, and afforded constitutional protection to,
the parents’ decision to keep their daughter out of high school, in order
to pursue a more traditional life in their Amish community. 65 The
decision came over the objections of the State, which argued that public
policy, and the girl’s own interests, required school attendance, arguing
that “education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively
and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve
freedom and independence,” and that “education prepares individuals
to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society.” 66 But the
Supreme Court was sensitive to the cultural and religious foundations of
the Amish community, according them a certain degree of deference
and respect: “There is nothing in this record to suggest that the Amish
qualities of reliability, self-reliance, and dedication to work would fail to
find ready markets in today’s society.” 67 Moreover, the Court readily
acknowledged the value of cultural pluralism in our society, something
that would be lost if we forced every family to conform to society’s
preferred approach: “Even their idiosyncratic separateness exemplifies
the diversity we profess to admire and encourage.” 68
It is not just the Supreme Court that has given formal recognition
to the legitimacy of diverse cultural traditions in child-rearing. Congress
65
66
67
68

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 221.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 226.
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passed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) in 1978, 69 precisely to
defend the cultural claim of Native American communities to their own
children. The statute was enacted “to address the long-standing practice
of removing Indigenous children from their families and placing them
with non-indigenous families in an effort to assimilate them into the
majority culture.” 70 The statute created strong presumptions for
indigenous custody, granting parents a right to publicly funded
counsel, 71 and imposing a “clear and convincing evidence” standard for
foster care placements, and a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for
terminations of parental rights. 72 The ICWA goes even further in the
protection of cultural interests, recognizing not just the rights of
indigenous parents, but also of the tribes, whose courts enjoy exclusive
jurisdiction over child custody cases on their respective reservations. 73
Of course, beyond the defined communities of the Amish and of
the sundry Native American tribes, American society is a
conglomeration of diverse cultural traditions whose core values are
often reflected in their approaches to family. 74 Portions of the United
States include large concentrations of Scandinavians, for example, for
whom it may be traditional to have infants take their naps outdoors,
often in sub-freezing conditions. 75 The practice is not rooted merely in
tradition, but in promoting health:
The theory behind outdoor napping is that children exposed to fresh
air, whether in summer or the depths of winter, are less likely to
catch coughs and colds—and that spending a whole day in one room
with 30 other children [at a day-care center] does them no good at
all. 76

It is difficult to criticize these Scandinavian parenting norms, as all four
of these countries are among the nine countries in the world with the
lowest infant mortality rates (Finland first, Sweden fourth, Norway
69 Indian Child Welfare Act, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1901–1963 (2012)).
70 NAT’L INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASS’N, THE CONTINUED REMOVAL OF INDIGENOUS
CHILDREN FROM THEIR FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES AND ITS IMPACT ON THE RIGHT TO
CULTURE 1 (2014).
71 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (2012).
72 § 1912(e)–(f).
73 § 1911(a).
74 “It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural.” Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977).
75 Helena Lee, The Babies Who Nap in Sub-Zero Temperatures, BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-21537988. Americans of Scandinavian descent may not
practice this widely after a generation or more in the United States, but the practice is very
much alive in those countries today. Id.
76 Id. There is research that shows that the children also sleep longer in the cold air. Id.
(“While indoor naps lasted between one and two hours, outdoor naps lasted from 1.5 to three
hours.”).
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sixth, and Denmark ninth). 77 The United States, where such a practice
might be viewed as dangerous, is twenty-seventh. 78
Consistent with this, in Denmark it is also a generally accepted
parenting practice to leave sleeping babies in their carriages outside a
store or café, while the caregiver goes inside. 79 The clash of cultures got
a Danish mother into serious trouble in the 1990s when visiting New
York. 80 When she left her child in a stroller on the sidewalk to enter a
restaurant, she was arrested for it, and her child was taken away. 81 But
the problem was largely one of perception and cultural expectations
rather than parental neglect; 82 it is unlikely that anyone would
characterize Danish parenting as inherently inferior to American
parenting, particularly given the excellent outcomes in Denmark. 83
In Japan, it is common for very young children to venture out,
taking subways to and from school and otherwise running errands,
unsupervised by an adult. 84 “It’s a culturally indoctrinated

77 Christopher Ingraham, Our Infant Mortality Rate is a National Embarrassment, WASH.
POST: WONKBLOG (Sept. 29, 2104), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/09/
29/our-infant-mortality-rate-is-a-national-embarrassment.
78 Id.
79 Id.; Emily Lodish, Global Parenting Habits That Haven’t Caught On in the U.S., NPR
(Aug. 12, 2014, 2:14 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/08/12/339825261/globalparenting-habits-that-havent-caught-on-in-the-u-s.
80 Tony Marcano, Toddler, Left Outside Restaurant, Is Returned to Her Mother, N.Y. TIMES
(May 14, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/14/nyregion/toddler-left-outside-restaurantis-returned-to-her-mother.html.
81 Id.
82 And in this case, the American legal system was willing to respect the cultural difference.
When the situation was explained and understood, the charges were dropped and the child was
returned to her parents. John Sullivan, Charges Against Danish Mother Are Dropped, N.Y.
TIMES (May 17, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/17/nyregion/charges-against-danishmother-are-dropped.html.
83 One might argue that what constitutes good parenting in Denmark would be bad
parenting in the United States, essentially because the higher U.S. crime rate places unattended
children at much higher risk in the United States than in Denmark. The argument has some
initial appeal, until the statistics are examined, and we see that kidnapping rates are about the
same in Europe as on this side of the pond. Steven Perlberg, The 20 Countries Where People Get
Kidnapped the Most, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 12, 2013, 3:58 PM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/top-20-countries-by-kidnapping-2013-12. Once again, fear of
kidnapping in the United States is far higher, but not necessarily because the risk is
commensurately higher. Moreover, to the extent that crime rates are lower in Denmark, that
fact would suggest that Danish child-rearing is getting something right, as their kids grow up to
be law-abiding citizens, and perhaps U.S. parents should be doing more to emulate the Danes.
84 Amy S. Choi, How Cultures Around the World Think About Parenting, TED TALKS (July
15, 2014), http://ideas.ted.com/how-cultures-around-the-world-think-about-parenting.
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understanding that children are supposed to be independent by the time
they start grade school, really, so that’s age six.” 85 Parents who split time
between Japan and the United States have to alter their parenting to
conform to the expectations of others. As one Japanese mother
observed: “‘If I let them out on their own like that in the U.S., I wouldn’t
just get strange looks,’ she says. ‘Somebody would call Child Protective
Services.’” 86
Families in Hispanic and Native American communities are far
more likely to expect older children to take responsibility for younger
children. 87 Hispanic families have been larger on average, 88 so the
cultural practice may be born in part from practical necessity. Professors
Bernstein and Triger, in their article on over-parenting, give a variety of
other examples of cultural differences:
Childrearing practices vary considerably across cultures. Many
alternative formats of childcare exist where it is not necessarily the
mother, the parents, or even a particular adult providing the care. In
many societies across the world, siblings play a central role in
providing care and instruction. While European-American families
rarely use a babysitter under the age of twelve, in many societies five
to ten year olds care for toddlers. In some cultures, grandparents play
a central role in child rearing. In other societies, the children of
several mothers mingle, and whoever is free takes care of them,
regardless of whether they are her children or not. In many cultures,
the assumption is that “the mother is often too busy to tend to the
child.” In some cultures, “a mother is chastised by peers if she is
overly fond of her child.” 89

In fact, there are many approaches to parenting, rooted in diverse
cultural traditions, and parents should have a right to raise their
In Japan, where Gross-Loh lives part of the year, she lets her 4-year-old daughter run
errands with her 7-year-old sister and 11-year-old brother—without parental
supervision. Her kids don’t hesitate to take the Tokyo subways by themselves and
walk on busy streets alone, just like their Japanese peers. But when she comes back to
the States, Gross-Loh doesn’t allow the same. “If I let them out on their own like that
in the U.S., I wouldn’t just get strange looks,” she says. “Somebody would call Child
Protective Services.”
Id.

85 In Japan, First Graders Travel Solo to School on the Train, CBS NEWS (Dec. 15, 2015, 8:26
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/japanese-young-children-solo-commute-subway-school
(quoting Teru Clavel, a Japanese-American sociologist featured in the story).
86 Choi, supra note 84.
87 WASH. RISK ASSESSMENT PROJECT, supra note 16, at 35.
88 Hispanic Family Size in USA Shrinking, POPULATION RES. INST. (June 10, 2015), https://
www.pop.org/content/hispanic-family-size-usa-shrinking (noting “the long tradition of large
Hispanic families” and that “Hispanic immigrants are presently helping to bolster the U.S.
birthrate”).
89 Bernstein & Triger, supra note 10, at 1267; see also id. at 1266–69 (section entitled
“Intensive Parenting and Cultural and Ethnic Differences”).
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children in a manner consistent with their means and their own cultural
values. The suggestion that everyone in America must conform to the
highly-protective norms that have emerged in mainstream American
society runs contrary to pluralistic values. When the norms are enforced
with threats to break up families or impose criminal punishment, it
moves beyond mere ethno-centrism, and becomes a form of cultural
imperialism.
D.

The Unexamined Constitutional Rights of Parents

While the Supreme Court has recognized that parents enjoy a
fundamental liberty interest in their decisions about how to raise their
children, those Fourteenth Amendment rights are not being adequately
protected in the cases being brought against free-range parents. There is
reason to believe that they are not even being asserted, and certainly not
pressed at an appellate level in a way that might generate precedent for
these cases in the future. 90
Typically, when parents are reported and either law enforcement or
CPS arrives to assess the situation, the parents are likely to be afraid,
desperately afraid, of one thing: having their children taken away from
them. 91 They understandably try to cooperate and to reassure the
investigators that they can be trusted with the continuing care of their
children. 92 That often means the following: (1) ready admissions of
90 Guggenheim and Sankaran suggest that there may be issues of standing that would
prevent parents from challenging the constitutionality of the state’s action in taking their
children from them. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM & VIVEK S. SANKARAN, REPRESENTING PARENTS IN
CHILD WELFARE CASES: ADVICE AND GUIDANCE FOR FAMILY DEFENDERS 36 (2015).
91 After publishing my first article on this subject, in which I speculated that fear of
criminal liability may prompt parents to opt for an overprotective parenting style, I received a
steady stream of email traffic from parents concerned about the issue, and they were not afraid
of criminal liability. Their primary fear was that their children would be taken away from them.
It is a curious thing because the intervention and investigation is based on suspicion that these
parents do not care enough about their kids to protect them adequately. The ones who care
about those kids, in the reporting scenario, are the neighbor who calls 911, or the authorities
who intervene. But these same parents, accused of being so neglectful, are willing to make
enormous sacrifices of their dignity, freedoms, and rights, in the hope of hanging onto these
same kids that they are accused of caring so little about.
92 In 2000, the American Bar Association published a guide to representing parents in child
welfare cases that advised attorneys to urge cooperation and to avoid confrontation:

Although you must zealously represent the parent, experience shows that
confrontational and obstructionist tactics often tend to be counterproductive to the
parent’s interests. Since the agency and the court wield enormous and continuing
power over the life of the child and, therefore, the parent, it benefits your client when
you are selective in deciding which issues to contest.
DIANE BOYD RAUBER & LISA A. GRANIK, REPRESENTING PARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE CASES 4
(Mimi R. Laver ed., 2000). “[A] productive working relationship with the agency . . . may
help . . . minimize needlessly contentious relationships between the parents and agency
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wrongdoing, (2) abject apologies, and (3) promises never to do it again.
On that basis, the matter gets settled, and the parents, though shaken by
the experience, are allowed to keep their children. After all, it is easier to
persuade the authorities that this is not likely to happen again than to
persuade them that there is nothing wrong with the judgment call the
parent made, or that the parental judgment is within constitutionallyprotected bounds. As a result, the parents’ right to raise their children
with a hands-off, long-leash parenting philosophy is never litigated, and
it is very effectively chilled. 93 Indeed, the parents in these cases can end
up with a record of some kind, either a criminal record from their guilty
plea to a child-neglect offense,94 or at least a listing on the state’s registry
of child abusers, which can have huge consequences for these
individuals’ employability in certain professions, and in child custody
disputes that might arise in the future. 95 At the same time, they have
promised to abandon their free-range parenting practices, despite any
beliefs they may have that long-leash parenting is what is best for their
children.
The impact is not limited to that family. Neighbors, onlookers, and
anyone who has learned of the story in the media may be similarly
intimidated, profoundly chilling the exercise of the parents’
constitutional rights. Parents learn from these incidents that they are
caseworkers, and facilitate negotiated settlements that ensure the protection of the child
without unnecessarily infringing on the family’s integrity.” Id.
93 Constitutional challenges may be overdue in other contexts where parental rights have
been undervalued. Vivek Sankaran notes:
[C]hild welfare systems continue to disregard the constitutional rights of
nonoffending parents, individuals against whom the state has made no allegations
and who thus have done nothing wrong other than to have a child in common with a
parent who allegedly abused or neglected the child. These parents are presumed to be
unfit based simply on their association with the other parent.
Vivek S. Sankaran, Parens Patriae Run Amuck: The Child Welfare System’s Disregard for the
Constitutional Rights of Non-Offending Parents, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 57 (2009). “These systems
are ripe for constitutional challenges.” Id. at 78.
94 See, e.g., Bridget Kevane, Guilty as Charged, BRAIN CHILD (Jan. 14, 2014), http://
www.brainchildmag.com/tag/bridget-kevane (describing the Bozeman, Montana case); infra
text accompanying notes 111–12 (discussing the Jonesboro, Arkansas case).
95 See Lawrence, supra note 42 (discussing the serious impact of being listed on such
registries). The stigma associated with such a listing may trigger procedural due process rights.
Applying the “stigma plus” test, the reputational harm plus a legal disability that is caused by a
government action, courts may find that a liberty interest was infringed, and that procedural
due process must be afforded. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (public school
students suspended for alleged misconduct, given the harm to the students’ reputation, may
have suffered a loss of a liberty interest); see also Brandt v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 820 F.2d
41, 44–45 (2d Cir. 1987) (teacher accused of sexual misconduct with students suffers
constitutionally cognizable harm because of the impact on his future job prospects); RICHARD
HENRY SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE CASEBOOK 435 (Michael
Hunter Schwartz ed., 2013); James L. Buchwalter, Application of Stigma-Plus Due Process
Claims to Education Context, 41 A.L.R. 6th 391 (2009).
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not permitted to trust their own instincts in parenting their kids. They
may feel like they have to keep their kids from playing outside, climbing
trees, riding bikes in the neighborhood, walking to school, or a range of
other activities—any activity that a busybody observer might deem
inappropriate and report to authorities.
Of course, the chilling of parental rights is a serious problem, but
the circumstances of these cases are such that the cases almost always
settle quickly without any adjudication of the parents’ rights. Because
any attempt to dig in one’s heels and assert constitutional rights and
prerogatives is only likely to delay or jeopardize the return of one’s
children, it is not surprising that the parents’ rights in these cases have
been overlooked.
Moreover, to the extent that parents are waiving their
constitutional rights in these cases, be they civil or criminal, it is not at
all clear that the waivers are voluntary. In Vaughn v. Ruoff, a mildly
retarded woman, whose two children were already in state custody, was
coerced into a waiver of her rights in the decision whether to submit to
tubal ligation. 96 The social services worker was found to have violated
her rights by promising her that she could get her two kids back if she
agreed to the procedure: “A sterilization is compelled, not voluntary, if it
is consented to under the coercive threat of losing one’s children, and
hence unconstitutional.” 97 It follows that Mr. Meitiv’s consent to a
“safety plan” for his children, and the waiver of his parenting rights in
that moment, may not have been voluntary, as it was coerced by the
threat of removal of his children. 98
The result is a failure of constitutional checks and balances. If the
executive branch is overreaching in these cases, it is the role of the
judicial branch, unexercised whenever parents decline to assert their
rights, to check the executive’s power to disrupt families in this way. 99
At the same time, courts can be overly deferential to the executive
agencies. 100 There may be potential for legislative intervention, as seen

Vaughn v. Ruoff, 253 F.3d 1124 (8th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1130. The force of that promise—or the implied threat that refusal to submit to
sterilization would keep her children from her—may be sufficient to render the consent
involuntary. Id. at 1129 (“A jury could reasonably find that Ruoff’s comments about getting the
two children back implied that the children would not be returned to the Vaughns if they did
not agree to sterilization. A jury could properly conclude from such a finding that Margaret’s
sterilization decision was not voluntary but rather was coerced, and this, we hold, implicates
due process concerns.”). Nothing in the Vaughn decision suggests that the finding of coercion
was based in any way on Vaughn’s limited mental capacity. The holding suggests that anyone
would be coerced by the threat of taking one’s children away, or the promise of their return. Id.
98 St. George, supra note 1.
99 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803).
100 See, e.g., discussion infra Section V.D (discussing the hearings in removal cases).
96
97
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recently with the passage of the Every Student Succeeds Act, 101 signed
into law on December 10, 2015, which included a provision that
[N]othing in this Act shall . . . prohibit a child from traveling to and
from school on foot or by car, bus, or bike when the parents of the
child have given permission; or expose parents to civil or criminal
charges for allowing their child to responsibly and safely travel to and
from school by a means the parents believe is age appropriate. 102

This language was proposed by Senator Mike Lee of Utah, who made a
point that he was pushing back against the legal trends discussed above:
Our amendment protecting parents who allow their kids to walk to
school is definitely a silver lining. Unsupervised moments are a huge
part of how children learn, grow, and build the skills that prepare
them for the rigors of citizenship and the adventure of adult life.
America faces great challenges today. Kids walking to school with
their parents’ permission is not one of them. 103

At the same time, however, the legislative branch is vulnerable to
the popular hysteria/paranoia over child safety, and can be expected to
respond to and validate the fears of their constituents. This is evident
from the spate of new legislation criminalizing leaving kids in cars. 104
The statutes are, by and large, unnecessary, since it is already a crime to
neglect or endanger a child in every state. More likely, these statutes are
likely passed either (1) to pander to a public obsessed with child safety,
or (2) merely to publicize and highlight the dangers of leaving kids in
cars. The latter rationale raises the question of whether passing harsh
criminal legislation is an appropriate means of conducting a public
education campaign. But this is precisely the purpose of such legislation
according to child safety advocate Janette Fennell: “The purpose of the
laws is not to be the parent police. . . . What they’re really meant to do is
to say, maybe you don’t know this is serious, but it is.” 105 In either case,
the legislative branch is not, for the most part, playing a meaningful role
101 Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 6303b–7934
(2015)).
102 FreeRangeKids.Com, President Obama Signs First Federal “Free-Range Kids” Legislation,
PR NEWSWIRE (Dec. 10, 2015, 3:16 PM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/presidentobama-signs-first-federal-free-range-kids-legislation-300191494.html.
103 Id.
104 As of August 2014, there were twenty states with laws addressing leaving a child in a
parked car, most of them criminalizing the practice. Josh Harkinson, Where Is it a Crime to
Leave a Kid Alone in a Parked Car?, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 7, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://
www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/08/parents-arrested-leaving-kids-alone-cars; State Laws,
KIDSANDCARS.ORG, http://www.kidsandcars.org/resources/state-laws (last visited Aug. 2,
2016).
105 A. Pawlowski, From Errand to Crime: Parents Now Face Hard Consequences for Leaving
Kids in Car, TODAY (July 12, 2013, 8:03 AM), http://www.today.com/parents/errand-crimeparents-now-face-hard-consequences-leaving-kids-car-6C10584642.
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as a check on the executive in these cases; no one wants to run for reelection having “voted against child safety” protections.
In most jurisdictions, child protection agencies, police and
prosecutors are unlikely to overreach, and meddle in the lives of parents
who choose to give their kids a long leash. Many of the state actors are
overwhelmed by their caseloads already, dealing with serious problems,
kids who are coming to harm or facing genuine threats to their health
and safety. But if, and whenever, these authorities decide to target a freerange parent, or anyone else who fails to buy into the intensive
parenting norms, the parents are likely to be intimidated, quickly cave,
and let the state run roughshod over their parental rights and
prerogatives.
E.

The Best Interest of the Child Standard

The jurisprudence of parents’ rights has been complicated
somewhat by the occasional misapplication of the legal standard of the
“best interest of the child.” 106 This standard, which shows up in a variety
of statutes, can be problematic because, if applied in a free-range
parenting scenario, it marginalizes parental prerogatives, constitutional
and otherwise, suggesting that the court, rather than the parent, can and
should be the arbiter of what is best for a child. 107 In Quilloin v. Walcott,
the Supreme Court acknowledged the constitutional problem with
applying the best interest of the child standard as a basis for infringing
on parental rights:
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended
“[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family,
over the objections of the parents and their children, without some
showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was
thought to be in the children’s best interest.” 108

106 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); the case cited infra note 107. For a good
discussion of how the standard has been applied see CHILDREN’S BUREAU, DETERMINING THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (2012).
107 It is reported, for example, that in the State of Washington, a 13-year-old was removed
from his family and placed in foster care after the child complained that his parents made him
go to church too often. The judge agreed that the parents’ church attendance requirements
were excessive, and allowed the parents to recover custody of their son only after the parents
agreed to less-frequent church attendance. ParentalRights.org, The Threat: Attacks on Parental
Rights, http://www.parentalrights.org/index.asp?SEC=%7B81C1F260-4A9F-4013-816468A360E295A5%7D (last visited July 13, 2015).
108 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816, 862–63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
657–58 (“The State’s interest in caring for Stanley’s children is de minimis if Stanley is shown to
be a fit father.”).
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For the most part, states narrowly limit its application by statute, 109
frequently suggesting that it is applicable only after parents are found to
be unfit, 110 but the concept seems to color the actions of state authorities
in parenting situations. In Jonesboro, Arkansas, for example, a mother
was arrested for child endangerment after making her fourth grader
walk to school, in an effort to teach him a lesson after he had been
suspended from the school bus for misbehavior on it (a fifth offense). 111
The arresting officer explained his decision to intervene:
“You ask yourself the question, is that safe for the child?” said
Jonesboro Police spokesman Sgt. Lyle Waterworth.
“And if you wouldn’t want your child doing it, you probably don’t
need some (other) child doing it.”
“There were a number of things that could have happened to the
child. The child could have been injured, abducted,” said Sgt.
Waterworth. 112

The officer obviously thought that he was acting in the best interest
of the child, and perhaps he was. But in so doing, he completely
undermined the mother’s authority with the child, as well as
109 In Utah, for example, after a finding that a parent is “unfit,” the court may apply the best
interest of the child standard to determine whether to terminate parental rights. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78A-6-503(12) (West 2016). The language of the statute otherwise emphasizes the
importance, in terms of child welfare, of preserving the integrity of the family:

(8) It is in the best interest and welfare of a child to be raised under the care and
supervision of the child’s natural parents. A child’s need for a normal family life in a
permanent home, and for positive, nurturing family relationships is usually best met
by the child’s natural parents. Additionally, the integrity of the family unit and the
right of parents to conceive and raise their children are constitutionally protected.
***
(12) Wherever possible family life should be strengthened and preserved, but if a
parent is found, by reason of his conduct or condition, to be unfit or incompetent
based upon any of the grounds for termination described in this part, the court shall
then consider the welfare and best interest of the child of paramount importance in
determining whether termination of parental rights shall be ordered.
Id. § 78A-6-503(8), (12).
110 See, e.g., id.; see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 (“[T]here is a presumption that fit parents act
in the best interests of their children.”); infra text accompanying notes 120–22. However, courts
have also struggled with the concept of “fitness,” which is undoubtedly a vague and subjective
standard. See, e.g., Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 780 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (striking down an
Alabama state law stating, “When is a home an ‘unfit’ or ‘improper’ place for a child?
Obviously, this is a question about which men and women of ordinary intelligence would
greatly disagree. . . . Because these terms are too subjective . . . the statute is unconstitutionally
vague.”).
111 Mother Who ‘Forced 10-Year-Old Son to Walk 5 Miles to School Faces Jail Time for
Endangerment’, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 19, 2012, 12:54 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-2103412/Mother-forced-10-year-old-son-walk-5-miles-school-faces-jail-timeendangerment.html.
112 Id.
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undermining the specific lesson the mother was attempting to teach
him.
The “best interest” standard is an appealing one at face value
because children are viewed as innocent and vulnerable parties who
cannot protect their own interests; it may seem obvious that the courts
and the “system” should be looking out for the child. Indeed, the
relevance and applicability of the standard is sometimes assumed, as
reflected in the opening of a recent article in the Washington State Bar
Association’s magazine:
“Best interest of the child.” This is a standard familiar to many
attorneys. It’s used in the application of a number of different
laws . . . . Employment of this standard demonstrates the state’s
concern for the most vulnerable members of society Decisions made
in the child’s best interests often trump whatever rights may be held by
adults, and rightly so. 113

The suggestion that this standard should be employed to trump
“whatever rights may be held by adults” is presented as axiomatic. 114 No
defense or explanation is needed.
But application of this standard, at least in situations where parents
are in agreement on their parenting decisions, 115 and not otherwise
“unfit,” invites courts to disregard parental interests and rights, to
second-guess parental determinations of what is best for their family
and for their children, and to intervene, for the sake of children,
whenever parental actions are not up to scratch. 116 Moreover, the
standard does little to constrain the judge, as Justice Stevens explained
in his concurring opinion in Bellotti v. Baird, which dealt with a minor’s
right to an abortion:
[T]he only standard provided for the judge’s decision is the best
interest of the minor. That standard provides little real guidance to
the judge, and his decision must necessarily reflect personal and
societal values and mores whose enforcement upon the minor—
particularly when contrary to her own informed and reasonable

113 Elizabeth Polay, Diane Wiscarson & James Gayton, Raising the Floor: Advocating for
Special Education Services, NWLAWYER, Nov. 2015, at 13 (emphasis added). The article goes on
to advocate the use of this standard in the provision of special education services. Id.
114 Id.
115 When parents separate from each other, and have differing visions of how their child
should be raised—most commonly, who should have custody—it becomes impossible for the
state (or the court) to defer to parental judgment. In those cases, the parents’ dispute must be
settled by a court, and the court may properly invoke the “best interest of the child” in deciding
between the parents’ separate and inconsistent visions for their child. See infra Section III.C.
116 GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 40 (“The best interests standard necessarily invites the
judge to rely on his or her own values and biases to decide the case in whatever way the judge
thinks best. Even the most basic factors are left for the judge to figure out.”).
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decision—is fundamentally at odds with privacy interests underlying
the constitutional protection afforded to her decision. 117

If courts are going to second-guess parenting decisions based on a
“best interest” standard, they will, in effect, be applying a de novo review
of the parenting decision itself, and doing so with “little real
guidance.”118 Their decisions similarly will “reflect personal . . . values
and mores” that may be at odds with the interests underlying the
constitutional protections parents should otherwise enjoy. 119
This is essentially what happened in the Supreme Court case of
Troxel v. Granville, in which grandparents were seeking access to their
grandchildren, despite the parent’s objections. 120 The Washington State
statute allowed “[a]ny person” seeking visitation rights to apply to the
court “at any time,” and that the court could grant such visitation rights
whenever “visitation may serve the best interest of the child,” and the
first-instance court had granted such visitation to the grandparents. 121
The Supreme Court upheld the reversal of this decision, holding that
this “breathtakingly broad” statute could not constitutionally be applied
to second-guess the parents’ judgment on what is in their child’s best
interest. 122
Of course, part of the problem with the “best interest” standard is
the word “best.” 123 If that were to become a legal standard for state
interventions, then it doesn’t matter how good a parent’s parenting is,
intervention could be justified anytime a “better” alternative is
identified. The legal standard for judging and second-guessing parental
choices—to justify state intervention—has to be articulated in terms of a
minimum standard rather than an aspirational ideal. Even marginal
parents are entitled to some deference; the state shouldn’t be able to
intervene unless the parenting falls below minimum standards of
adequacy. The concept of “best interest” is meaningful only after the
prospect of entrusting the child to the parents is off the table. If the
parents are splitting up, and custody of the child is in dispute, the court
should settle the custody dispute in an effort to do what is best for the
child. If the parents have been found to be unfit, the court must decide
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 655–56 (1979).
Id. at 655; GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 39–41.
119 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 655; GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 40–41 (“Painter demonstrates
that unless judges are constrained by principles, they will always be unleashing an unfettered,
uncontrollable power.”). See Pimentel, supra note 9, at 49 (“[I]t has been independently
confirmed that women who are mothers are harder on other mothers who ‘have failed to
protect their children.’” (quoting Ann T. Greeley, Women on the Jury: Stereotypes and Reality, 2
ATLA Ann. Convention Reference Materials 2689 (2003))).
120 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
121 Id. at 67 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3)).
122 Id.
123 Conversation with Barbara Glesner Fines (Jan. 8, 2016).
117
118
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what to do with the child, in terms of custody and services; those
decisions should be made in consideration of what is best for the child.
But as long as there are fit parents on the scene, who agree on the
parenting of their child, there should be no reason for the authorities to
be considering the best interests of the child. The law presumes that fit
parents act in the best interests of their child, 124 and promotes the
children’s interest most effectively by deferring to those parents. The
concept was explained by the Supreme Court in Santosky:
At the factfinding, the State cannot presume that a child and his
parents are adversaries. After the State has established parental
unfitness at that initial proceeding, the court may assume at the
dispositional stage that the interests of the child and the natural
parents do diverge. But until the State proves parental unfitness, the
child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous
termination of their natural relationship. 125

Not only are interventions, justified solely by the “best interest of
the child,” constitutionally problematic, they also threaten to disrupt the
family and to undermine parental authority. In so doing, ironically
enough, these actions may cause considerable harm to children, and for
a variety of reasons. 126 First, the intervention itself is likely to upset the
child’s sense of stability and security. 127 It is undoubtedly terrifying for a
child to see his or her parent placed under arrest, or threatened with
arrest. Second, although parents are likely to make mistakes from time
to time, the state is no less likely to make mistakes; the intervention
itself—justified by what the state perceives to be “the best interest of the
child”—may reflect the state’s own misjudgment of the situation.
Indeed, there are compelling reasons to trust the parents’ judgment
more than the states’ on issues of child welfare, as (a) the state lacks the
intimate knowledge of this child’s particular personality, capabilities,
and needs, and as (b) the state lacks the level of commitment a parent
typically demonstrates to the happiness and well-being of his or her
child. 128 Finally, while there will no doubt be instances when state
124 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 (“[T]here is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests
of their children.”).
125 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982) (citations omitted).
126 GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 40–41 (discussing Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152
(Iowa 1966), “This case brilliantly demonstrates what is unleashed when courts are free to
decide a case based on the judge’s perception of a child’s best interests. . . . The case is described
to show that one’s views of a child’s best interests are contingent upon the decisionmakers’
beliefs and values and that it is impossible to separate their views from those beliefs and
values. . . . Painter demonstrates that unless judges are constrained by principles, they will
always be unleashing an unfettered, uncontrollable power.”).
127 Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the Children: The Ironic Costs of
a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 413, 418–19
(2005).
128 GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 35–38.
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intervention is necessary to protect children from serious neglect or
abuse, a general policy of quick and early intervention will affect
virtually every family—many that will suffer unjustified interventions,
and the rest which will live in fear of such interventions. 129
The upshot is that an interventionist policy is not in the best
interest of children, even if individual interventions could be justified on
a “best interest” basis. Accordingly, legislatures, agencies, and courts
must resist the temptation to resort to a simple appeal to the best
interest of the child in justifying state intervention in the parent-child
relationship. There is a proper time and place to apply this standard, as
discussed infra, but courts and legislatures must be careful to limit its
application otherwise, both as a matter of good public policy, and of
respecting the constitutional rights of parents.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS FOR PARENTS’ RIGHTS
The constitutional foundation for parents’ rights in these freerange parenting cases follows from Rousseau’s social contract, 130
understanding the delineation between what government is designed to
do (i.e., spheres of authority granted to the government, and those
retained by the people). 131 “[O]nly those rights individuals intend to
submit to government authority are properly within that authority to
regulate. John Locke developed similar ideas, arguing that many natural
rights of men and women, including the parental power to raise
children, are beyond government’s power to invade.” 132 The Supreme
Court has identified an array of these rights, retained by the people,
worthy of particular protection because they are “implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty” 133 or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition.” 134 These “fundamental rights and liberty interests” are
entitled to “heightened protection against government interference,” 135
and include the “rights to marry, to have children, to direct the

Id.
Id. at 21 (“Since, according to Rousseau, this form of government depends on the
consent of the governed, only those rights individuals intend to submit to government
authority are properly within that authority to regulate.”).
131 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 438 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (quoting James Madison’s summary of
an argument offered by Federalist defenders of the Constitution during the ratification debate:
“[I]t follows, that all [powers] that are not granted by the Constitution are retained; that the
Constitution is a bill of powers, the great residuum being the rights of the people.”).
132 GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 21.
133 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
134 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion).
135 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
129
130
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education and upbringing of one’s children, to marital privacy, to use
contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion.” 136
A.

Strict Scrutiny Under the Fourteenth Amendment

Absent a fundamental right, the state’s interference can be justified
in terms of a “reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest,” but in
the case of a fundamental liberty interest, it requires “complex balancing
of competing interests in every case.”137
Specifically, the state action is subject to “strict scrutiny,” meaning
that the government must demonstrate (1) a compelling state interest in
the action it is taking, and (2) that the action is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest. 138 Some cases have added the requirement that the
state action must also be the “least restrictive alternative to advance the
Government’s compelling interest.” 139 This would be a formidable
hurdle for the state to clear in the free-range parenting cases, if the state
were called upon to defend its interventions in the family against such a
demanding constitutional test. But for the reasons stated above, the
state’s actions against parents are rarely subjected to this close
examination, despite the fact that such actions seriously encroach upon
the fundamental liberty interests of parents.
The compelling state interest would likely be asserted as child
safety, and it may seem obvious that protecting children from harm is
sufficiently compelling. But in the free-range kid cases, the state should
have to prove that the children are actually in danger when, for example,
playing in the park without an adult present to supervise. That may be
much more difficult to do, especially given the statistics that show that
“stranger danger” incidents in the United States are statistically
negligible. 140 Some courts have glibly asserted the child safety
justifications as self-evident, and declined to examine actual risks and
dangers, such as a New Jersey court that concluded “we need not
describe at any length the parade of horribles that could have attended
[this] neglect,” denying the mother a hearing in which she had hoped to
show that her children were not, in fact, in any significant danger for the
few minutes she left them alone in the car. 141

Id. at 720 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. at 722.
138 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 470, 470–72 (1989).
139 Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 198 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Sable
Commc’ns of Cal. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
140 CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 102.
141 Dep’t of Children & Families, Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. E.D.-O, 82 A.3d 330,
334 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014), rev’d, 121 A.3d 832 (N.J. 2015).
136
137
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Even more difficult to defend may be the heavy-handed approach
sometimes taken by authorities when intervening in the family, as these
are unlikely to be sufficiently “narrowly tailored” or the “least restrictive
means” for protecting the children. 142
States must show both that (1) their actions further a compelling
state interest and (2) they have chosen the least restrictive means to
advance it or they are violating the Constitution. See City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) (“Requiring a State to demonstrate a
compelling interest and show that it has adopted the least restrictive
means of achieving that interest is the most demanding test known to
constitutional law.”). 143

Arrests, confrontations with parents, threats of incarceration or of
removal of the children, and condemnations in front of the children,
seem to be difficult to justify, as such confrontations can do irreparable
damage to parental authority and to children’s sense of security and
stability. 144 “Children . . . react even to temporary infringement of
parental autonomy with anxiety, diminishing trust, loosening of
emotional ties, or an increasing tendency to be out of control.” 145 Taking
custody of the children, and keeping them for hours—and causing them
to miss dinner—before even notifying the parents, as was done in the
Meitivs’ second encounter with the state, 146 seems to be a particularly
disproportionate response to the speculative danger of stranger
abduction which presumably prompted the police action in the first
place. 147 And if the governing principle is the well-being of the children,
the state would need to be rescuing the children from a genuinely grave

142 See Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181. In Mukasey child protection interests came into direct
conflict with First Amendment rights, specifically in the context of access to pornography on
the Internet. The Third Circuit applied strict scrutiny analysis, and held that even something as
compelling as child protection could not justify state action that was not narrowly tailored, or
the “least restrictive means” of pursuing the state interest: “In addition to failing the strict
scrutiny test because it is not narrowly tailored, [the challenged law] does not employ the least
restrictive alternative to advance the Government’s compelling interest in its purpose, the third
prong of the three-prong strict scrutiny test.” Id. at 198.
143 GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 90, at 12–13.
144 See Coleman, supra note 127.
145 GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 38 (quoting JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT
SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 25 (1979)).
146 Kelly Wallace, Maryland Family Under Investigation Again for Letting Kids Play in Park
Alone, CNN (Apr. 24, 2015, 12:43 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/13/living/feat-marylandfree-range-parenting-family-under-investigation-again (“Meitiv wrote, ‘The police coerced our
children into the back of a patrol car, telling them they would drive them home. They kept the
kids trapped there for three hours, without notifying us, before dropping them at the Crisis
Center, and holding them there without dinner for another two and a half hours.’”).
147 “Children need and greatly benefit from a sense of security. That sense of security
therefore deserves prominent protection.” GUGGENHEIM, supra note 24, at 37 (citing Ronald
Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 487 (1989)).
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situation for them to justify subjecting them to the harms that the
intervention itself will inflict upon them.
Enforcement of a state requirement that children be under the
watchful eye of an adult every minute of the day would be overkill as
well, not sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny. Parents
should be able to put an infant down for a nap and then turn their
attention to other things, or grab a nap of their own, 148 while the child
sleeps. Parents of older kids should be allowed to give them windows of
minimally-supervised or unsupervised play time, increasing with the age
and maturity of the child. 149 If the parents’ actions are genuinely
creating unacceptable risks to a child, a least restrictive means of
addressing that problem may be to offer educational opportunities to
the parents on safety issues, to help the parents be more attentive to the
dangers their child faces. Threats to arrest the parents or to take their
children from them—actions that are deeply disruptive of the family, of
parental and child security, and of family autonomy—are unlikely to be
narrowly tailored or the least restrictive means for creating a safer
environment for the child.

148 There have been recent incidents where parents have been arrested, when their child
wanders off while the parents are asleep. E.g., Scott Powell, Mother Arrested for Sleeping While
Her Three Year-Old Wanders the Streets, WTNH (Dec. 19, 2014, 9:32 PM), http://wtnh.com/
2014/12/19/mother-arrested-for-sleeping-while-her-three-year-old-wanders-the-streets
(describing a mother charged with “risk of injury to a minor”); Terri Sanginiti, Mother Charged
After Tot Wanders Off, DELAWARE ONLINE (June 21, 2011), https://web.archive.org/web/
20110701094051/http://www.delawareonline.com/article/20110621/NEWS01/106210351/
Mother-charged-after-tot-wanders-off (“A Glasgow woman who took a nap after putting her 3year-old daughter down for one was arrested on child endangerment charges after the child was
found wandering around the neighborhood, police said.”); Dan Schrack, 3-Year-Old Child
Wanders Route 5, While Mother Sleeps, WIVB (June 14, 2015, 8:24 AM), http://wivb.com/2015/
06/14/3-year-old-child-wanders-route-5-while-mother-sleeps (describing how a mother was
arrested for endangering the welfare of a child).
149 JULIE LYTHCOTT HAIMS, supra note 38, at 153 (“If you feel the need to observe your kid
playing . . . practice being at a greater distance than usual, and continually increase that
distance as your child ages.”).

[T]he systemic problem of overparenting is rooted in our worries about the world
and about how our children will be successful in it without us. Still, we’re doing
harm. For our kids’ sakes, and also for our own, we need to stop parenting from fear
and bring a more healthy . . . approach back into our communities, schools, and
homes.
Id. at 8; see also Dorothy O’Keefe Diana, Helicopter Parents, It’s Up to You to Let Go Now as
Your Teens Get Ready for High School, HUFFINGTON POST (July 7, 2016), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/dorothy-okeefe-diana/helicopter-parents-its-up-to-you-to-let-gonow-as-your-teens-get-ready-for-high-school_b_7736806.html.
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What Is Included in Constitutionally-Protected Parents’ Rights?

The rights of parents have been elaborated in a variety of disparate
cases. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court considered the case
of a grandmother, who lived with her son and two grandsons (who were
not brothers but cousins to one other), convicted for a criminal
violation of a housing ordinance that limited dwellings to a single
family. 150 The Court overturned the conviction, saying that the
ordinance’s purposes—to reduce overcrowding, traffic congestion, and
undue burdens on the local schools—were not sufficiently compelling to
warrant “slicing [so] deeply into the family itself.” 151
Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of
the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition. It is through the family
that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values,
moral and cultural. 152

Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, decided in 1925, involved attempts to
enforce mandatory school attendance policies, against the parents’
preferences for an education more consistent with their own cultural
and religious values. 153 The law requiring students to attend public
schools, as opposed to parochial schools, was struck down as
“unreasonably interfer[ing] with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control,” 154
relying on Meyer v. Nebraska, another public education case decided
just a couple of years earlier. 155
Almost fifty years later, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court
added, “The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their
children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition.” 156 As explained above, the Court went on to hold that an
Amish family could not be compelled to send their daughter to high
school, 157 showing considerable cultural sensitivity in its analysis.
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 498.
152 Id. at 503–04.
153 Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
154 Id. at 534–35.
155 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
156 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972). For a more thorough discussion of the case
see supra text accompanying notes 65–68.
157 In Yoder, however, the Court was careful to note that “[t]his case . . . is not one in which
any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or
welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly inferred,” distinguishing it from cases where
the Court had upheld vaccination requirements and mandatory blood transfusions, over the
150
151
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Enforcing intensive parenting norms leads down a road toward de
facto prohibitions on large families, 158 since no one can offer that level
of supervision to so many children at once, or toward treating children
as a luxury good, since low-income families cannot afford the level of
intensive child care that would be required of them. The right to have
children has been recognized as a fundamental human right, 159 but if the
legal system will punish parents who don’t, or can’t, provide intensive
parenting to all their children, the system will effectively force people to
curtail their family size, chilling the exercise of their fundamental right
to procreate. 160
This outcome is not consistent with American core values, which
celebrate and protect religious and cultural diversity, respecting the
diverse traditions in our pluralistic society, through protecting parental
autonomy. 161 The assumption that there is only one correct way to
parent, and that safety is of such importance that other cultural values
must yield to the safety imperative, is a rather offensive form of cultural
imperialism.
Some of the Supreme Court’s strongest rhetoric about the
constitutional rights of parents comes from the 2000 case of Troxel v.
Granville, discussed above, in which grandparents were seeking
visitation rights with their grandchildren, over the objection of the
parent. The Court had no problem dismissing the grandparents’ claims,
recognizing the parents’ fundamental rights over the “care, custody, and
control of their children”162:
objection of the parents. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230. In free-range kid cases, the state will urge that
the child faces physical harm from walking home from school or playing in the park because
the child could be abducted. Parents in those cases will have to persuade the court that the risk
of harm to the child is negligible; the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of the parents on this
point, but because people, including judges, seem to trust their own irrational fears more than
the hard data, it may still be a hard sell.
158 Of course, limitations on family size have been widely condemned as a violation of
fundamental human rights. “When China announced the end of its one-child policy [in
October 2015], the general response . . . was positive, with many articles appropriately and
unequivocally condemning the policy and praising its demise.” Jeremy Carl, China’s Children
and Climate Change–The Left Is Against Them Both, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 2, 2015, 3:00 PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/426458/chinas-children-and-climate-change-leftagainst-them-both-jeremy-carl.
159 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (procreation is “one of the basic civil
rights of man”); see also Vaughn v. Ruoff, 253 F.3d 1124, 1129 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Sterilization
results in the irreversible loss of one of a person’s most fundamental rights . . . . [Defendant]’s
conduct violated [Plaintiff]’s Due Process Clause right to be free from coerced sterilization
without appropriate procedures.”); supra text accompanying notes 96–97; cf. Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding compulsory sterilization as constitutional in very limited
circumstances).
160 The right to procreate has been recognized as “one of the basic civil rights of man.”
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
161 See discussion supra Section I.C.
162 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
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The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in the
care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of
the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court. More
than 75 years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401
(1923), we held that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process
Clause includes the right of parents to “establish a home and bring
up children” and “to control the education of their own.” Two years
later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–535 (1925), we
again held that the “liberty of parents and guardians” includes the
right “to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control.” We explained in Pierce that “[t]he child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations.” Id. at 535. We returned to the subject
in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), and again confirmed
that there is a constitutional dimension to the right of parents to
direct the upbringing of their children. “It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” Id. at 166. 163

Following Troxel, state courts too have subjected infringements of
parents’ rights over the “care, custody, and control of their children” to
strict scrutiny. 164 This has been held to prohibit state authorities from
second-guessing parenting decisions simply because a state judge
believes a better decision could have been made. 165
Against this backdrop, it seems clear that the parenting decisions of
the Meitivs, and of other free-range parents, are entitled to strong
constitutional protections. 166 This is an example of parents who were
702, 720 (1997) (“In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause
includes the rights to . . . direct the education and upbringing of one’s children . . . .”).
163 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65–66.
164 See, e.g., Dutkiewicz v. Dutkiewicz, 957 A.2d 821, 830 (Conn. 2008) (“[A] parent’s
interest in the care, custody and control over his or her child is a fundamental right.”); see also
Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 144–45 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (describing parents’
fundamental right to raise their children by stating “the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents” (citing Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill.2d 455, 474 (Ill. 2000))); Cent. Tex.
Nudists v. Cty. of Travis, No. 03-00-00024-CV, 2000 WL 1784344, at *3 (Tex. App. Dec. 7,
2000) (recognizing that parents have a general right, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to
direct the upbringing of their children).
165 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 71.
166 The Second Circuit has gone further to suggest that the right of the family to stay
together is shared not just by parents, but also by children. Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d
817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[T]he right of the family to remain together without the coercive
interference of the awesome power of the state. . . . encompasses the reciprocal rights of both
parent and children.”); see also Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 600 (2d Cir. 1999)
(opining parents and children share a fundamental liberty interest to “remain together without
the coercive interference of the awesome power of the state.”).
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attempting to “prepare [their children] for additional obligations,” 167
and to “inculcate” them with values, including the values of
responsibility and self-sufficiency. 168
III. TENSIONS INHERENT IN THE RECOGNITION OF “RIGHTS”
It is important to put the rights of parents in context. These are not
rights that parents typically assert in a self-interested manner, as they
are often exercised for the benefit of others: namely, their children. At
the same time, parenting is a right and a privilege claimed by every
species that raises their own young, and the joy and fulfillment that
comes with raising a family, with seeing one’s children grow up and,
hopefully, do well may be one of the most fundamental privileges of the
human experience, unattainable in any other pursuit. 169 Accordingly,
the sanctity of the family and of the parent-child relationship is
something that parents are unlikely to surrender lightly, even to state
authorities who purport to be acting in the interest of those very same
children.
Under a Hohfeldian analysis, the parents’ rights might be
characterized as an “immunity,” to the extent that it is a “freedom from
the legal power or ‘control’ of another as regards some legal relation,”
i.e., as regards the parent’s legal relation to her (or his) own child. 170
Non-parents cannot typically intervene or interfere with issues of childrearing, as that would be exercising control over the parent, interfering
with that parent’s rights, or as Hohfeld might put it, that parent’s
“immunity” from such control. 171 But that characterization only
highlights the fundamental problem in our characterization of parents’
rights: from whose control is the parent immune?
Indeed, an archetypal framework for consideration of rights issues
is the overlapping of one person’s rights with his neighbors: I enjoy
freedom to exercise my rights, but that freedom is limited precisely by
the need to respect your rights. The minute that the exercise of my rights
interferes with the exercise of your rights, my rights have reached their
logical and protectable limit. 172 The limitation on a parent’s right might
Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sister, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977).
169 See, e.g., Lawrence Rifkin, Is the Meaning of Your Life to Make Babies?, SCI. AM.: GUEST
BLOG (Mar. 24, 2013), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/is-the-meaning-of-yourlife-to-make-babies.
170 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 55 (1913).
171 Id.
172 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ¶ 29(2) (Dec. 10,
1948) (“In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such
167
168
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be viewed from a variety of perspectives, including (1) the rights of the
child, (2) the rights of the state, and (3) the rights of the child’s other
parent or legal caregiver. Each will be considered in turn.
A.

Parents’ Rights v. Children’s Rights

At the outset, it is tempting to consider the question of parental
rights as limited by the rights of the children: that the parents’ rights
come at the expense of children’s rights. 173 For example, a farmer’s right
to put his children to work in his fields and barns may be limited by the
children’s right not to be exploited, as well as rights children enjoy
under statutes barring child labor. A parent’s right to discipline the child
is limited by the child’s right not to be abused, limiting the parent’s
discretion to inflict severe physical punishments.
Applying this concept to free-range parenting, the state justifies its
interventions in the family, its second-guessing of parenting decisions,
as necessary to protect the children from the dangers their parents are
subjecting them to. The state, in other words, may be said to be acting to
vindicate the rights of children, pushing back on the rights of the
parents.
The archetype—that parents’ rights come at the expense of
children’s rights, and vice versa—may be misapplied when argued in the
typical case of parent and child, particularly because the model is based
on assumptions of self-serving by all parties. It is not, however, the
norm of human experience that parents pursue only their own selfish
interests when it comes to child-rearing; parenting is in large part an
altruistic enterprise. When parent and child butt heads, as the parent of
any teenager knows, it is usually the case of the parent insisting on
something the parent perceives to be in the interest of the child, which
conflicts with what the child perceives to be in his own interest. Both
parties—parent and child—are trying to act in the interest of the child,
and they simply disagree about how best to go about it.
Because parents are responsible for, and typically committed to, the
welfare of their children, it is only in the most exceptional case that a
child would need protection from the parent. If the state presumed that
parents’ interests inherently conflict with children’s interests, it would
be natural for the state to assume the role of regulatory body, for the
protection of the children. It is, perhaps, this mindset that has prompted
the state to overreact to the parenting choices of free-range parents and
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality,
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.” (emphasis added)).
173 This is apparently what happened in British law. See MCCALL SMITH, supra note 25.
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to others who, for cultural, religious, socio-economic, or other reasons,
choose a less intensive parenting style. But it follows from a very curious
assumption that the state somehow cares about the welfare of those
children more than their own parents do. Anyone making such
assumptions can hardly have known any parents.
Rather, child welfare advocates, and state entities, should not
assume that parental rights are somehow at cross-purposes with child
welfare. For reasons that will be argued below, there are compelling
reasons to believe that respecting parents’ rights and discretion in their
parenting decisions—rather than monitoring them, second-guessing
them, and intervening whenever a parental lapse is perceived—is the
best way to protect child welfare, serving both the rights and the
interests of children far more effectively. Indeed, this may be the most
compelling policy reason that parents should enjoy constitutional
protection for their parenting decisions.
B.

Parents’ Rights v. State Parens Patriae Rights

When the state does seek to intervene, it brings the state’s right into
direct conflict with the parents’ right. The line-drawing question then
becomes one of how extensive the parent’s right is, against the state’s
competing interest to act on behalf of the child, and on behalf of society.
Parens patriae is the state’s power to protect vulnerable citizens
incapable of protecting themselves. 174 There can be little question that
the state has an important role to play here in cases of, for example,
sexual abuse or severe physical abuse of children. If the parents cannot
or do not protect the children from such abuse, and particularly if the
parents are the ones inflicting the abuse, the state’s parens patriae power
is appropriately invoked to intervene in the family for the protection of
the children.
The question arises, however, as to how far parens patriae power
extends, especially as it applies to free-range parenting. What if there is
no actual harm to the child, but only a risk of harm to the child? In such
cases, when should the state be permitted, consistent with constitutional
limits on state power, to second-guess the parents’ judgment on what is
best for the child, and intervene in the parent-child relationship? As
already noted, the state cannot constitutionally intervene in the family if
the parents are fit; as the Supreme Court held in Stanley v. Illinois, “The
State’s interest in caring for Stanley’s children is de minimis if Stanley is
shown to be a fit father.” 175
174
175

Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th pocket ed. 2011).
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657–58 (1972).
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Those interventions dramatically undermine the family’s stability
and the child’s sense of security, when the state takes children from their
parents, or threatens to do so by launching an investigation. 176
Accordingly, as parents are already entrusted by nature, by moral duty,
and by law, with the care and welfare of their children, the state’s
intervention can be justified only by the most extreme dereliction of that
parental duty. Otherwise, because such disruptive interventions are
inherently harmful to children, the state abuses its parens patriae power
to protect children when it intervenes in the parent-child relationship.
The intervention comes at expense of parents’ constitutional rights, of
course, as well: their fundamental liberty interests, as discussed above.
C.

One Parent v. the Other Parent

We also see parental rights discussed in the context of cases pitting
the rights of one parent against another parent, or against someone who
would play a parenting role. 177 The typical parent v. parent case,
however, addresses the simple matter of custody after the parents have
parted ways.
These cases are less problematic, in terms of the state’s
overreaching and meddling in the family relationship, because the
family itself is at a stalemate and needs, even invites, the state’s
intervention. In this situation, the parents do not agree on what is best
for the child. 178 It is therefore entirely appropriate for the state to apply
the “best interest of the child” standard to settle the matter.
It makes sense in this type of dispute to apply the “best interest of
the child” standard because the parental stalemate makes it impossible
for the state to defer to the parents’ judgment. Indeed, it can be
presumed that the parents are both trying to serve the child’s best
interest, 179 and because they disagree, the court needs to break the tie,
applying the same standard that a parent would, i.e. what is best for the
child. The disruption of the family and of the child’s sense of security is
a fait accompli, carried out by the parents themselves with the
See Coleman, supra note 127.
The battle may not be just between parents, but parent v. step-parent, Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), or grandparent v. parent, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
178 Of course, parents may not always be acting in the best interest of the child. They may
want custody not because it would be good for the child, but because they vindictively wish to
deprive the other parent of such custody, or any of a number of other selfish reasons. In such
situations, it is the responsibility of the court to set aside such ignoble motives and act in a way
that minimizes the harm the child is already suffering. In any case, the court is still basing its
decision on what it perceives to be “the best interest of the child.”
179 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 (“[T]here is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests
of their children.”).
176
177
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dissolution of that family, so the state’s intervention is not causing the
harm, just resolving the ongoing dispute.
This scenario, therefore, is far different from those articulated
above, where the state is insinuating itself into the family, trying to
substitute its own child-rearing approach for what the parents have
adopted and presumably agreed upon. The state’s perception of what is
in the best interest of the child should be invoked to settle a dispute
between the parents, but never to disrupt an intact family, with fit
parents, where no such disagreement exists. 180
IV. PARENTAL POWERS AND DUTIES
A.

The Legal “Power”

Given that the parents’ rights are not really about the interests of
the parents, it may be helpful to consider more nuanced readings of
“parental rights.” Alexandra Popovici argues that the parental interest is
not so much a “right” as a “power.”181 She draws upon the work of
Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, who has derived the concept of “The Legal
Power” from the Civil Code of Québec, as something “distinct from the
right,” rather a “prerogative granted in order to achieve a purpose.” 182
Popovici suggests that “[r]econceptualising the parent as a power
holder, and not a right bearer helps in truly understanding the dynamics
at play and in shifting the discussion to what really matters: the
protection and empowerment of children.” 183
Rather than a right, “which the holder can use in his or her own
interest,” Popovici argues that a parent has “a prerogative conferred in
the interest of another.” 184 This characterization of the issue invokes the
180 Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246, poses an interesting example here. In that case, the absentee
natural father, who had never taken steps to legitimate his child, objected to the proposed
adoption of the child, now eleven years old, by the stepfather. The key precedent was Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, which had held that the state could not take custody of children over the
objection of their unwed father, absent a finding that the father was unfit. But the Supreme
Court distinguished Stanley, and allowed the adoption, even though it meant extinguishing the
natural father’s parenting rights, relying on the best interest of the child in making that
determination. The controlling factor in this case, however, appeared to be the preservation of
an intact family (the family consisting of the mother and stepfather, who had enjoyed sole
custody of the child the whole time the child was growing up), and the mother of the child
favored the adoption. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 254–55.
181 Alexandra Popovici, Children at Play: Parenthood Contextualized, Paper Presentation at
the Law & Society Association Annual Meeting (May 29, 2015) (abstract on file with the
author).
182 Madeleine Cantin Cumyn, The Legal Power, 17 EUR. REV. OF PRIV. L. 345 (2009).
183 Popovici, supra note 181.
184 Id.
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concept of duty. The parent’s right over the rearing of her or his
children cannot be considered without acknowledging, at the same time,
the parent’s duty to the child. Therefore, applying the civil law concepts,
the “best interest of the child” should not be invoked as a limitation on
the parents’ rights, but rather as defining the duty of the parents in the
exercise of the legal power over their children.
B.
1.

The “Duty”
Fiduciary Duty

Another way to look at the parental role is as a fiduciary, again
defining the duty of the parent to act in the best interest of the child.
Lionel Smith has explored this concept in the context of Canadian
common law, applying established principles of fiduciary duty to the
parenting role. 185
Of course, fiduciary duties have been defined and conceptualized
in a variety of ways, but if the fiduciary duty is defined as a duty of
loyalty—a duty to act in the best interests of the beneficiary—Smith
argues, it fits rather closely the legal expectations we have for parents.
It is easier to imagine how this is a fiduciary duty if one thinks of
the duty of the state when a child becomes a ward of the state. Certainly,
the state has a duty to provide for the child—food, shelter, clothing,
education, etc.—and to make these provisions in order to serve the
child’s best interests. The state cannot be expected, however, to develop
and maintain an affective bond with the child, even though parents
almost universally do. As the Supreme Court explained in Parham v.
J.R.,
[O]ur constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a child
is “the mere creature of the State” and, on the contrary, asserted that
parents generally “have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare [their children] for additional
obligations.” . . . The law’s concept of the family rests on a
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity,
experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s
difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that

185 The Canadian Supreme Court formally recognized a fiduciary duty on the part of parents
in the case of M.(K.) v. M.(H.), 3 S.C.R. 6 (1992). In that case, a woman who had been sexually
molested by her father all the years she was growing up, sued him in tort, alleging, among other
things, a breach of fiduciary duty. Lionel Smith, Parents as Fiduciaries, Paper Presentation at
the Law & Society Association Annual Meeting (May 29, 2015) (Professor Smith’s notes on file
with author).
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natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of
their children. 186

This may be one of the most instructive aspects of Smith’s
discussion of fiduciary duty, how parenting differs from the typical
fiduciary relationship. The law may not be able to require a caregiver,
parent or otherwise, to love a child, even though that may be what the
child needs most. But parents typically do provide that, and a whole lot
more than what they may be legally required to provide to their
children. A fiduciary does not typically expend his own resources,
depriving himself, for the benefit of the beneficiaries. And yet parents
do that all the time. Indeed, parents typically provide far more to their
children—(1) individual attention, (2) love (including manifestations of
that love through quality time, hugs, etc.), (3) a sense of security,
belonging, and self-esteem as a valued member of the household, etc.—
than the law does, or could ever, require. And that is all the more reason
to entrust children’s welfare to the parents rather than to the state, in
situations where the state might otherwise try to intervene.
2.

The Business Judgment Rule

The other useful concept in the law of fiduciaries, as applied to the
parent-child relationship, is the “business judgment rule.” Corporate
directors have a fiduciary relationship toward the corporation and its
stockholders, but directors have to be protected from liability for their
good faith actions. The business judgment rule creates a strong
presumption in favor of the directors, insulating them from liability for
decisions that ultimately harm the corporation. The presumption is that
“in making business decisions not involving direct self-interest or selfdealing, corporate directors act on an informed basis, in good faith, and
in the honest belief that their actions are in the corporation’s best
interest.” 187 It ensures that a court “will not substitute its own notions of
what is or is not sound business judgment,” 188 except in the absence of
such informed good faith. 189

Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (emphasis added).
Business-Judgment Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th pocket ed. 2011); Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
188 Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720.
189 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), rev’d, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244
(Del. 2000).
186
187
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Application to Parents

The application to parents is obvious and compelling. If we
characterize parents as fiduciaries, we afford them a strong presumption
in favor of their parenting decisions. We ensure that no court or other
regulatory body will “substitute its own notions of what is or is not
sound [parenting] judgment,”190 as long as parents are reasonably
“informed,” acting in “good faith and in the honest belief” that their
action was in the best interest of the child. 191 Indeed, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed, in Troxel v. Granville, that “there is a presumption that fit
parents act in the best interests of their children.”192
Unfortunately, it appears that parents are not always being
afforded this type of presumption, as CPS workers, police officers,
prosecutors, and courts appear to have no qualms about substituting
their own notions of what constitutes good parenting for that of the
parents themselves, and make no particular effort to demonstrate
parental bad faith in these cases. Certainly free-range parents like the
Meitivs could never have been implicated for child neglect if they had
enjoyed such a presumption under the law.
4.

Issues of Risk

One of the key rationales for the business judgment rule is that if
corporate directors faced liability for losses of the corporation, they
would never dare take any risks, and that shareholders would suffer from
the overly conservative approach directors would be compelled to
adopt. 193 But that is precisely what parents are forced to do now, to take
an absurdly conservative approach to parenting—where virtually no risk
to the child is considered acceptable 194—and the children suffer.
Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720.
See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
192 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
193 Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
194 Compelling examples of this are easy to find, as parents are charged with crimes for
letting children play in the park, or for leaving their children in the car for a few minutes while
they dash into a store to pay for gas, etc. Childhood injuries and deaths from being left in cars
have attracted a lot of attention, and the advice to parents is never to leave a child in a car “not
even for a minute!” Jan Null, Heatstroke Deaths of Children in Vehicles, NOHEATSTROKE.ORG
(Sept. 9, 2016), http://noheatstroke.org. This is even though the risk of harm for leaving a child
in a car for such a short time—especially when the climate control system of the car is left
running—is essentially zero. See John N. Booth III et al., Hyperthermia Deaths Among Children
in Parked Vehicles: An Analysis of 231 Fatalities in the United States, 1999–2007, 6 FORENSIC
SCI., MED., & PATHOLOGY 99 (2010) (documenting that the harm to children typically comes in
situations where the children are left in the car for hours). The “not even for a minute” advice
undoubtedly comes from the fact that over half of the deaths come from situations where the
190
191
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Surely parenting is as difficult, and as fraught with risk, as the
business world, and the overprotection of children has been widely
documented as harmful to them, just as overly cautious business
strategy is bad for shareholders. 195 Parents, unlike corporate directors,
are already hard-wired to be protective of their children, so the threat of
legal liability seems unnecessary to provide parental incentives to take
care. But fear of legal liability may impair parental judgment—it
undoubtedly does, now that cases like the Meitivs’ are getting
publicity—to the detriment of the families themselves.
Our legal system recognizes that directing a corporation is an
exercise in risk management, and that the health and profitability of the
American corporation requires that directors be free to make such risk
management decisions without fear of liability. Parenting too is an
exercise in risk management, as protecting a child from one risk, almost
inevitably subjects him or her to another risk. 196 It is a curious thing
indeed if the law is more solicitous of the health and interests of the
corporation, and of its shareholders, than it is of the health and interests
of the American family, and its youngest and most vulnerable members.
One might quibble with the analogy, as children and corporations
are hardly equivalent. 197 Nonetheless, it is neither wise nor rational to let
remote risks dominate decision-making, particularly when the price of
precaution outweighs its expected value. Tort law requires persons to
child was forgotten in the vehicle; if you don’t leave your child in a car for even a minute, the
child cannot be forgotten there. Id. The prosecutions of parents, however, have often involved
parents who have not forgotten about the children, and who have left the car’s climate control
system engaged, and in which the child did not come to harm. Erring on the side of caution
may be good safety advice, but our society has begun to treat a parent’s failure to exercise such
an abundance of caution as a criminal offense.
195 Pimentel, Criminal Child Neglect, supra note 9, at 958–59.
196 Id. at 961–62.
197 Of course, the well-being of children is not perfectly analogous to the health of a
corporation. Failure of a commercial enterprise, unlike the loss of a child, might be deemed a
necessary loss, even a good thing, for the health of the industry and the economy overall.
Investors, unlike children, have voluntarily chosen to assume such risks. Moreover, investors
can diversify their portfolios to hedge against the failure of a corporate strategy, a risk taken
that turns out badly. While some investments fail, others may more than compensate, resulting
in positive portfolio growth overall, arguably greater than if every company were managed
conservatively. It is hard to look at children this way, and no one would argue that the success
of one child could compensate for the loss of another. In earlier eras, when infant mortality was
commonplace and childhood diseases routinely claimed the lives of their victims, things may
have been different. But even if having a larger family mitigated the tragedy somewhat in those
days—so the “portfolio” would be doing well, despite the loss of one of the children—it can
never be easy to rationalize that loss. And to the extent that was ever true, it is not so today, as
families are smaller, and the few children born into modern families are perceived to be all the
more precious. HONORÉ, supra note 41, at 243 (“The fewer kids you have, the more precious
they become and the more risk-averse you get.” (quoting DAVID ANDEREGG, WORRIED ALL THE
TIME: REDISCOVERING THE JOY IN PARENTHOOD IN AN AGE OF ANXIETY (2001))); see also
MARGARET K. NELSON, PARENTING OUT OF CONTROL: ANXIOUS PARENTS IN UNCERTAIN TIMES
17, 23 (2010) (referencing the “preciousness” effect).
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behave reasonably in the taking of precautions, and will not find
negligence unless the likelihood times the gravity of the harm is greater
than the cost of avoiding it. 198 Once we acknowledge that parenting is
inherently an exercise in risk management, we need to offer some
protection for the parents who make those judgment calls. Arguing that
the standards for risk avoidance should be high does not change the fact
that almost every parenting decision is an exercise in risk-management,
a decision where reasonable minds may differ. And unlike corporate
directors, it appears that parents—who, after all, are doing their best
without the benefit of professional training or expertise—are not getting
the benefit of the doubt, or the deference they need and deserve, in the
tough risk management decisions that they make on a daily, even
hourly, basis. 199
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF PARENTS’ PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
Given that the Supreme Court has already opined on the rights of
parents for the care and custody of their children, and recognized the
fundamental liberty interest at stake, the problem for parents caught up
in these cases may lie not so much in their substantive rights as in the
procedures that are failing to protect those substantive rights. “On
numerous occasions, the Court has described the deprivation in child
protective cases as a ‘unique kind of deprivation,’ implicated by even a
temporary dislocation of a child from his or her parent’s custody. This
deprivation warrants heightened procedural protections not typically
applicable in civil proceedings.”200 Protecting these procedural rights
poses legal and logistical challenges, however.
A.
1.

Right to Counsel

Right to Counsel Under the Fourteenth Amendment

First, parents do not enjoy a constitutional guarantee of counsel in
these cases. In a 5-4 decision in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,
198 This was the holding, of course, of the venerable Learned Hand decision in United States
v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
199 See the discussion of parenting as risk management in Pimentel, Criminal Child Neglect,
supra note 9, at 961–63; see also Brooks, supra note 55 (“I’ve been doing every minute of every
day since having children, a constant, never-ending risk-benefit analysis.”).
200 Sankaran, supra note 93, at 68 (citing M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127–28 (1996)). “In
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., the Court concluded that due process required courts to furnish indigent
litigants trial court transcripts, free of cost, when appealing termination of parental rights
decisions.” Id. (citations omitted).

PIMENTEL.38.1.1 (Do Not Delete)

2016]

11/4/2016 5:06 PM

PROTECTING THE FREE-RANGE KID

45

the Supreme Court found no such right under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment (unless they are
also charged with a crime, in which case the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel applies), or, apparently, any other provision of the
Constitution. 201
Of particular interest, however, are the dissents in Lassiter. Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, felt it was
fundamentally unfair to not afford an indigent defendant the right to an
attorney in a termination preceding, given that “[t]he State’s ability to
assemble its case almost inevitably dwarfs the parents’ ability to mount a
defense.”202 To illustrate this disparity, Justice Blackmun quoted trial
excerpts that painfully depicted the pro se parent’s inability to represent
herself. 203 “The court gave petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine
[a] social worker, but she apparently did not understand that crossexamination required questioning rather than declarative statements. At
this point, the judge became noticeably impatient . . . .” 204 The state then
introduced prejudicial hearsay evidence, to which the “[p]etitioner
made no objection.”205 When the judge asked the petitioner if she had
any closing arguments, she responded merely: “Yes. I don’t think it’s
right.” 206 Thereafter the trial court ordered the termination of her
parental rights. 207 The fundamental unfairness of such proceedings,
coupled with the unique importance of parental rights, persuaded the

201 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981). Outside the criminal context, the
Supreme Court has used the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to make the
determination if appointed counsel is constitutionally required. Specifically, the court will use
the Mathews v. Eldridge test balancing (1) the nature of the private interest, (2) the risk of
erroneous deprivation of the private interest without the requested procedure, and (3) the
government’s interest. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
202 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982). In this case, the Supreme Court went
detailed listing the advantages the state has in parental termination proceedings. Specifically,
the Court stated that there are:

[n]o predetermined limits restrict[ing] the sums an agency may spend in prosecuting
a given termination proceeding. The State’s attorney usually will be expert on the
issues contested and the procedures employed at the factfinding hearing, and enjoys
full access to all public records concerning the family. The State may call on experts
in family relations, psychology, and medicine to bolster its case. Furthermore, the
primary witnesses at the hearing will be the agency’s own professional caseworkers
whom the State has empowered both to investigate the family situation and to testify
against the parents. Indeed, because the child is already in agency custody, the State
even has the power to shape the historical events that form the basis for termination.
Id.

Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 54–55, n.22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 54.
205 Id. at 53.
206 Id. at 56. In addition, when the petitioner’s mother, an important witness, took the stand,
“[p]etitioner was not told that she could question her mother, and did not do so.” Id. at 55.
207 Id. at 19 (majority opinion).
203
204

PIMENTEL38.1.1 (Do Not Delete)

46

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

11/4/2016 5:06 PM

[Vol. 38:1

four dissenting justices that parental rights could not be constitutionally
extinguished without right to counsel. 208
In his separate dissent, Justice Stevens agreed with the other
dissenters, but stated he would take his reasoning “one further step,” to
equate the parents’ rights in these cases to those of criminal
defendants. 209
The state may incarcerate [a person] for a fixed term and also may
permanently deprive [that person] of her freedom to associate with
her child. . . . Although both deprivations are serious, often the
deprivation of parental rights will be the more grievous of the two. The
plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that both
deprivations must be accompanied by due process of law. 210

Justice Stevens’ suggestion that parental rights deprivations are
more serious than criminal incarcerations had been articulated a few
years earlier in the House of Representatives in the context of the Indian
Child Welfare Act, as the House committee report observed: “The
removal of a child from the parents is a penalty as great, if not greater,
than a criminal penalty.” 211 Consistent with this, Justice Stevens
concluded that, for the same reasons criminal defendants have a right to
appointed counsel, parents facing termination should have the same
right:
In my opinion the reasons supporting the conclusion that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles the defendant
in a criminal case to representation by counsel apply with equal force
to a case of this kind. The issue is one of fundamental fairness, not of
weighing the pecuniary costs against the societal benefits.
Accordingly, even if the costs to the State were not relatively
insignificant but rather were just as great as the costs of providing
prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel to ensure the fairness of
criminal proceedings, I would reach the same result in this category
of cases. For the value of protecting our liberty from deprivation by
the State without due process of law is priceless. 212

The history of the application of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel in criminal cases is instructive. In 1938, the Supreme Court held
the Sixth Amendment required the federal government to afford
indigent federal defendants appointed counsel. 213 Twenty-five years
later, in Gideon v. Wainwright, this Sixth Amendment requirement was
Id. at 35–60 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 59–60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210 Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
211 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 22 (1978), cited in Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 39 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
212 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 59–60 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
213 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
208
209
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applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 214 The
Supreme Court reasoned that “any person haled into court, who is too
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him,” citing specifically the typical defendant’s lack of
knowledge of the law and the vast sums of money and resources the
government has at its disposal to convict him. 215 These are precisely the
concerns motivating the dissenters in Lassiter, and if being deprived of
one’s children is “more grievous” than a criminal penalty, the right to
counsel in such cases is every bit as compelling as it is for criminal
defendants. 216
2.

Right to Counsel Under State Constitutions and Statutes

Nevertheless, many, but not all, states have statutes or case law
affording a right to counsel in state-initiated termination-of-parentalrights proceedings. Some of the states appear to have been inspired
directly by the dissents in Lassiter.
Although the 5-4 Lassiter majority did not recognize a categorical
Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel in these cases, the force of the
dissents has had great impact in various states. 217 Many states have
enacted statutes that provide counsel for parents in these proceedings. 218
A number of state courts have recognized it as a right notwithstanding
the Supreme Court’s holding in Lassiter. 219 The Alaska Supreme Court,
for example, interpreting its own state constitution, stated explicitly:
“[W]e reject the case-by-case approach set out by the Supreme Court in
Lassiter. Rather, our view comports more with the dissent.”220 Other
state courts have also pushed back against the Lassiter majority opinion,
including Connecticut, 221 Louisiana, 222 North Carolina, 223 and
Pennsylvania. 224
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Id. at 344.
216 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 40 (“Surely there can be few losses
more grievous than the abrogation of parental rights.”) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
217 Clare Pastore, Life After Lassiter: An Overview of State-Court Right-to-Counsel Decisions,
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y, July–Aug. 2006, at 186, http://
civilrighttocounsel.org/uploaded_files/37/Life_after_Lassiter__Pastore_.pdf.
218 Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statues Providing for a Right to Counsel in Civil Cases,
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y, July–Aug. 2006, at 245, http://
www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_39169.pdf.
219 Pastore, supra note 217, at 188–89.
220 In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276, 282 n.6 (Alaska 1991); Pastore, supra note 217, at 188–89.
221 Lavertue v. Niman, 493 A.2d 213, 219 (Conn. 1985) (citing Corra v. Coll, 451 A.2d 480
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)); see Pastore, supra note 217, at 188–89.
222 Louisiana ex rel. Johnson, 465 So. 2d 134, 138–39 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that
constitutional due process mandated appointment of counsel for indigent parents in
termination proceedings); see Pastore, supra note 217, at 188.
214
215
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However, Justice Stevens’ reasoning extends beyond the context of
the parental termination proceedings themselves. In criminal cases,
individuals are entitled to attorneys before their trial begins, before they
are even charged, as soon as their first custodial interrogation begins. 225
Miranda v. Arizona highlighted and addressed the problem of criminal
defendants’ rights to counsel being denied to them at this early stage,
and demanded both that defendants be informed of their rights to
counsel, and that questioning cease the moment the individual demands
an attorney. 226 Absent counsel at this stage in the proceedings, the
defendant is likely to waive his rights unwittingly, including his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. 227
The abuse of parents’ rights by CPS caseworkers cannot be nearly
as widespread as the constitutional violations by law enforcement that
underlay the Miranda decision. Nonetheless, the cases cited and
discussed above suggest tremendous potential to trample the rights of
parents in these cases, where parents’ child-rearing decisions are being
second-guessed. Mr. Meitiv’s attempt to invoke a right to counsel
prompted a threat to take his children away:
[A] CPS worker required [Mr. Meitiv] to sign a safety plan pledging
he would not leave his children unsupervised until the following
Monday, when CPS would follow up. At first he refused, saying he
needed to talk to a lawyer, his wife said, but changed his mind when
he was told his children would be removed if he did not comply. 228

Faced with such a threat, the waiver of the right to counsel, much
less the right to the “care, custody, and control” of his children, 229
cannot be fairly deemed voluntary. 230
No doubt Miranda changed the nature of police investigations, and
fundamentally altered the way police approach their work. 231 A right to
counsel for parents facing any investigation that could result in their
being deprived of their children could play a powerful role in
transforming the way CPS workers and other law enforcement approach
223 McBride v. McBride, 431 S.E.2d 14, 18 (N.C. 1993) (questioning the appropriateness of
Lassiter’s framework for all right-to-counsel determinations); see Pastore, supra note 217, at
189.
224 Coll, 451 A.2d at 487 (finding a putative father entitled to counsel in a paternity action);
see Pastore, supra note 217, at 188.
225 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 St. George, supra note 1.
229 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
230 See discussion of Vaughn, supra text accompanying notes 96–97.
231 Brooks Holland, Miranda v. Arizona: 50 Years of Judges Regulating Police Interrogation,
16 INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y 1 (2015); cf. George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of
Miranda v. Arizona: “Embedded” in Our National Culture?, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203 (2002).
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such families and their investigation of them. If the authorities are
required to advise parents of their rights, for example, they are far less
likely to overlook or disregard those rights. Richard Leo, a critic of
Miranda and a skeptic of its impact, 232 conceded: “Although they may
have devised clever strategies for successfully negotiating Miranda
waivers and thereafter eliciting statements, American police . . . have, by
necessity, become more solicitous of suspects’ rights, more respectful of
their dignity, and more concerned with their welfare inside the
interrogation room.” 233
Rights to counsel, and a requirement to advise parents of their
right to counsel, are likely to have a similar salutary effect on the CPS
caseworkers’ respect for parental rights. At the same time, if they know
that their investigative approach is likely to be questioned and
challenged by an attorney—rather than just the clueless and intimidated
parents—they may be more cautious in how they proceed, and be more
respectful of parents’ legitimate claims to the care and custody of their
children.
Although it is unlikely the Supreme Court would issue another
decision like Miranda in this area, particularly given the majority
holding in Lassiter, states can create a similar right to counsel, and the
right to be informed of these rights, at these initial stages. Indeed, a
number of state courts have embraced the reasoning in the Lassiter
dissents, and they have found in their state constitutions some
protection of a parent’s right to counsel. 234 And many states have
afforded such right to counsel by statute, although only in the context of
termination proceedings. 235 The state-level developments present a
promising precedent, and suggest a platform for affording further
protection and more meaningful enforcement of parental rights.
B.

Effective Representation

Some parents caught up in this process are also charged with
criminal child neglect or endangerment. 236 If so, they are entitled to an
attorney under the Sixth Amendment who may help them navigate
through the system. But whether they hire their own counsel, or get the
See Leo & Thomas, supra note 231.
Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 670
(1996) (emphasis added).
234 Pastore, supra note 217, at 188–89.
235 Abel & Rettig, supra note 218.
236 Although the Meitivs were never charged with a crime, Shanesha Taylor and Debra
Harrell were. See Friedersdorf, supra note 11; Grinberg, supra note 14 (citing also the arrest of
Nicole Gainey “after police found her 7-year-old son alone in a park less than a mile from her
home.”).
232
233
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benefit of court-appointed counsel, they are likely to end up with an
attorney who has expertise in criminal law, but who may be poorly
qualified to navigate the procedure of the child protection agency. 237
Indeed, the criminal lawyer is likely to advise her client not to cooperate
with authorities, at least not at first—a generally accepted strategy for
criminal defendants 238—when, arguably, this is exactly the opposite of
what should happen with the agency if the parent hopes to retain
custody of his or her children. 239
There are dangerous pitfalls to trusting the advice of a criminal
lawyer when compelling rights are at stake in other areas of law. In
Padilla v. Kentucky, a criminal lawyer advised an immigrant (a lawful
forty-year resident of the United States) to plead guilty to a drugdistribution charge, assuring him, erroneously, that the resulting
conviction would not provide a basis for the defendant’s deportation. 240
The Court allowed withdrawal of the guilty plea, noting that although
the deportation consequence was collateral, the client’s interest in
avoiding deportation was so great that the “affirmative misadvice”
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment: “[We] have previously recognized that ‘[p]reserving the
client’s right to remain in the United States may be more important to
the client than any potential jail sentence.’” 241 It is easy to imagine
criminal defense lawyer’s advice, notwithstanding its soundness in
terms of criminal law strategy, leading to bad outcomes in the
dependency or termination proceedings against the parents. Padilla
suggests that such outcomes may amount to a Sixth Amendment
violation.
Parents clearly need counsel, but not just any counsel. They need
counsel who know what they are doing in child protection cases.
Unfortunately, in states that provide counsel to parents under their
various statutory schemes, the attorneys may lack the qualifications and
experience to provide quality representation, 242 particularly in this
237 Barbara Glesner Fines, Almost Pro Bono: Judicial Appointments of Attorneys in Juvenile
and Child Dependency Actions, 72 UMKC L. REV. 337, 340 (2003).
238 See, e.g., James Duane, Don’t Talk to Police, YOUTUBE (June 21, 2008), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=6wXkI4t7nuc; James Kirk Piccione, Top Ten Reasons Why You
Should Not Talk to the Police, LAW OFFICES JAMES KIRK PICCIONE, http://
www.kirkpiccione.com/10-reasons-not-talk-police (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
239 See RAUBER & GRANIK, supra note 92, at 4–5; supra text accompanying note 91
(describing how immediate and full cooperation with the authorities is recommended as the
best strategy for keeping custody of one’s children in these cases).
240 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). Given the Court has also stated parental rights
are as serious as criminal incarceration, discussed supra, it would seem that the reasoning could
be extended to parental rights, under similar circumstances of Padilla.
241 Id. at 368 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001)).
242 Fines, supra note 237, at 345 (referring to panels of attorneys who take appointment to
represent indigent clients in civil proceedings, “attorneys participating in these panels are often
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specialized and sensitive area. Protection of parents’ rights, which
requires building the confidence of state authorities that the parents can
be trusted with their own children, requires that attorneys play
meaningful intermediary roles on behalf of parents: asserting the
parents’ rights without alienating the agency. It is a tall order, but
attorneys who develop expertise in the area have an opportunity to build
reputations and goodwill with the courts and with the agencies; such
attorneys are critical to the protection of parents’ rights in these
proceedings.
Barbara Glesner Fines explores alternative methods for providing
such counsel in her article Almost Pro Bono: Judicial Appointments of
Attorneys in Juvenile and Child Dependency Actions, with particular
emphasis on the method of the court’s appointing counsel, but allowing
the counsel to “buy out” of the obligation by hiring another attorney to
take the case, thereby fulfilling their court-appointed representation
obligation through delegation. 243 The “buy-out” option enables
attorneys to specialize in this area, and allows large firms to retain and
maintain well-qualified and well-resourced specialists in this area on
their own staffs, for the purpose of taking the cases whenever one of the
firm’s other attorneys is appointed to represent indigent parents in a
case involving alleged neglect or abuse. 244
A variety of other approaches have been adopted in the various
states, with varying degrees of success. 245 The important thing, in terms
of protecting the rights of parents, is that such parents have counsel who
are sufficiently experienced and knowledgeable to provide effective
representation and, as discussed below, that they have such counsel at
the critical stages of the proceedings.
C.

Appointment of Counsel at a Sufficiently Early Stage

Indeed, it is critical that parents have this representation early
enough in the investigation to be able to preserve and protect those
rights. As demonstrated above, parents may feel the need to waive their
rights in order to persuade the authorities not to take their children
from them. 246 Introducing counsel into this scenario may do little to
resolve the problems or defend the rights of parents if the parents have
inexperienced, new attorneys seeking experience and opportunities to establish
themselves . . . .” (citing Catherine Greene Burnett et al., In Pursuit of Independent, Qualified,
and Effective Counsel: The Past and Future of Indigent Criminal Defense in Texas, 42 S. TEX. L.
REV. 595, 606 (2001))).
243 Fines, supra note 237, at 347–51.
244 Id. at 350–51.
245 Id. at 344–47.
246 See supra text accompanying notes 22, 91–93.
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already waived their rights, just as a criminal defense attorney may be of
limited assistance to the defendant who, misunderstanding his own
rights, has already made self-incriminatory statements, or otherwise
opted to confess to the charged crime. 247
A related concern is when children have already been taken away,
and placed in foster care. Once the children are settled in foster care,
CPS and the courts may impose conditions for the return of the
children, and those conditions may involve considerable
micromanagement of the parents’ parenting style. 248 Protection of
parents’ rights over the care and custody of the children, therefore,
requires intervention by competent counsel before removal. Once the
children are removed, it is too easy for the system to dictate terms in
derogation of parents’ discretion over their children’s upbringing, to
substitute the judgment of CPS or the judicial officer for the judgment
of the parents on how best to parent the children. 249 Moreover, even a
temporary removal is an enormous imposition on parents’
constitutionally protected interests; 250 absent an emergency, even a
temporary removal should not be effected until parents have counsel to
protect their rights.
Paul Chill has written compellingly about “the tendency of
emergency child removal decisions—by social workers, police officers,
and judges—to become self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating in
subsequent child protective proceedings. This snowball effect, as one
court has referred to it, is widely acknowledged by lawyers who practice
in juvenile court.”251 Once removed, it can be very difficult to obtain the
return of the children to their parents. Chill observed in 2004:
Twenty years ago, an American Bar Association study reported that
“experienced litigators” in child protection cases found it difficult to
get children returned home “once removed, whether the original
removal was appropriate or not.” More recently, one such litigator
247 See supra text accompanying notes 225–31(discussing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)).
248 Fines, supra note 123.

Once a child is removed, a variety of factors converge to make it very difficult for
parents to ever get the child back. One court has referred to this as the “snowball
effect.” The very focus of court proceedings changes—from whether the child should
be removed to whether he or she should be returned. As a practical matter, the
parents must now demonstrate their fitness to have the child reunited with them,
rather than the state having to demonstrate the need for out-of-home placement.
Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of Emergency Removal in Child
Protective Proceedings, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 540, 542 (2004) (citation omitted).
249 Chill, supra note 248; Fines, supra note 123.
250 See supra text accompanying notes 144–47 (discussing how investigations and temporary
removals can do tremendous harm to the children too).
251 Chill, supra note 248, at 540.
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put it this way: “Possession is nine-tenths of the law. Children who
are with their parents at the beginning of a child protective
proceeding are likely to remain at home; children who have been
removed are likely to remain in governmental custody for a long
time, even years.” One clinical law professor has labeled this
phenomenon “tracking”—as in “a train getting on a track and
continuing to move down that track no matter what.” And one
nationally known jurist has written that issuance of an ex parte
removal order, “in so many cases, is indeed the ball game.” 252

The lesson here is that if parents’ rights to the care, custody, and
control of their children can be meaningfully protected only if the
parents can keep custody of their kids from the outset. “By seizing
physical control of the child, the state tilts the very playing field of the
litigation. The burden of proof shifts, in effect if not in law, from the
state to the parents.” 253 If the parents do not get counsel until after the
dislocation has occurred, their rights have already been seriously
compromised. “[T]he 1997 federal Adoption and Safe Families Act
(ASFA) . . . converts every day that a child spends in foster care into one
more tick of the clock in a countdown toward termination of parental
rights.” 254
In order to protect the parents’ rights, therefore, the provision of
counsel will be required at the time the first removal is attempted, long
before it is known whether the state will ultimately seek termination.
That suggests a lower threshold for the appointment of counsel than
exists in many states and, possibly, in any state. If the right to counsel
accrues only when the state files to terminate parental rights, the advice
of counsel is likely to be far too late to ensure the protection of parents’
rights. As noted above, it appears that many cases are resolved without
any hearing at all, with parents merely capitulating to the demands of

252 Id. at 543 (citing, inter alia, DIANE DODSON, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR ENDING FOSTER CARE DRIFT: A GUIDE TO EVALUATING AND IMPROVING
STATE LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND COURT RULES 3-1 (1983); David J. Lansner, Representing
Respondents in Child Protective Proceedings, in CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT AND THE FOSTER CARE
SYSTEM, 1998: EFFECTIVE SOCIAL WORK AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 583 (Practising Law Inst. ed.,
1998); Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children and the
Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 115–16 (1997)).
253 Chill, supra note 248, at 542.
254 Id. at 540. The referenced legislation was designed to make it easier for foster parents to
adopt the foster children entrusted to them.

ASFA generally requires states, as a condition of receiving federal funds, to file for
termination of parental rights with respect to any child who remains in foster care for
15 out of 22 consecutive months. . . . Under ASFA, parental rights can now be
terminated, or at least gravely threatened, on the basis of the mere passage of time.
Id. at 546 (citations omitted).
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CPS, whatever they are, in order to ensure they can keep custody of
their children. 255
D.

Rights to a Hearing When Children Are Removed

As mentioned above, removals constitute not only a deprivation of
liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment, but also a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. 256 Under County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, the
hearing must be held within 48 hours of seizure. 257 In some respects, the
short time frame for the hearing is an important protection of the
parents’ rights, because it ensures that they get judicial review of the
removal promptly. On the other hand, that is very little time to prepare
for a hearing where so much is at stake, even if the parents have
counsel. 258 Chill explains how it works in practice:
[T]he state ordinarily must provide notice and a hearing before
forcibly separating a parent and child. Courts have held that only an
imminent danger to a child’s life or health can justify removal of the
child without notice and a hearing first. Even then, a prompt
postremoval hearing must be held.
In practice, however, children are seldom removed on anything but
an emergency basis—either unilaterally, without a court order, or on
the basis of some form of ex parte judicial authorization. . . .
[D]ue process requires a prompt postremoval hearing even when
summary removal is justified. Yet these hearings are often shams.
They may be extremely brief, lasting 1 hour or less. Lawyers for
parents and children, moreover, if there even are any at this point,
may have barely had a chance to meet their clients, much less to
investigate the state’s evidence of imminent danger and prepare a
cogent response. Thus, the prospect of quickly undoing an
unnecessary emergency removal is fanciful at best in most cases. 259

The upshot is that it is extremely difficult to provide adequate
protection for parents’ rights in these proceedings. Without effective
and timely representation for the parents at this stage, there can be little
hope that the constitutional rights of parents, whose parenting has come
into question, will get adequate consideration.

See supra text accompanying notes 91–92.
GUGGENHEIM & SANKARAN, supra note 90, at 36.
257 Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
258 For the reasons set forth in the preceding sections, the parents typically will have no right
to counsel at this stage in the proceedings, and may well be appearing pro se.
259 Chill, supra note 248, at 541, 544 (citations omitted).
255
256
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Conclusions on Procedural Rights

The mechanics of attorney appointment, and what limits can or
should be imposed on CPS’s investigations in order to accord adequate
respect for parental judgments regarding their children’s activities and
levels of supervision, will need to be worked out. This Article’s purpose
is neither to spell out the details of such a system, nor to suggest that
implementation will be easy. However, the provision of counsel at a
meaningful stage in the process may be critical to protecting the rights
of parents.
Of course, Mr. Meitiv initially refused to sign anything until he
could consult with an attorney, and the demand for an attorney availed
him nothing. The CPS worker simply threatened to take his kids unless
he signed away his right to follow his own parenting judgment, 260 and
by so doing, effectively coerced him into waiving that right. 261 So in this
case, at least, even someone who can afford an attorney, and who asks
for one up front, was largely powerless to assert his constitutional rights.
Hopefully, a broader recognition of procedural rights of parents will
serve as a check on such bullying and intimidation of parents; otherwise,
the substantive Fourteenth Amendment rights of Mr. Meitiv, and of
every parent in America to control the care and custody of their
children, have little force or meaning.
VI. THE CHILLING OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
It may appear that the anecdotal reports of state interventions in
free-range families are exceptional. Indeed, the fact that several of these
cases have received significant publicity is by no means evidence that
such state interventions are common. There are no good statistics on
how frequently these arrests and interventions occur for parents who
are, for whatever reason—parenting philosophy, resource limitations,
culture, etc.—engaged in some type of free-range parenting; the
evidence comes anecdotally, mostly from news reports. But the publicity
given to recent highly-publicized cases, where parental rights were given
so little respect by state authorities, is certain to chill the exercise of
parental rights across the nation. The nightmare scenario of uniformed
officers appearing on one’s doorstep and threatening to take the
children away is like a scene from Sophie’s Choice. 262
St. George, supra note 1.
See discussion of coercion and involuntary waiver, in the context of the Vaughn case,
supra text accompanying notes 96–97.
262 In the movie, Nazis confronted a mother of two children as she was being inducted into
the concentration camp at Auschwitz, and asked her which child she wanted to keep, because
260
261
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As noted above, parents are unlikely to challenge the authorities
and assert their rights in these situations, opting instead to plead for
mercy in the desperate hope of keeping custody of their own children.
Thus, the rights are neither vindicated in the individual case, nor
defined by case law for future guidance to parents and state actors.
But parents, reading the news stories, will learn the powerful lesson
that they cannot trust their own judgment about what is best for their
children. They must now parent in a manner that respects the popular
paranoia about child safety. If any busybody in the neighborhood is
likely to disapprove of one’s free-range or long-leash parenting
practices, the parent can no longer pursue those practices, or otherwise
rely on his or her own instincts on how best to parent a child in a
potentially dangerous world. The fear of state intervention will certainly
chill the exercise of these parental rights, undermining constitutionally
protected family autonomy and, in all likelihood, the children’s own
interest.
CONCLUSION
As the legal system is targeting parents and parenting, applying
ever more demanding standards for child safety, it is vital that the
constitutional rights of parents be better defined and safeguarded. The
“best interest of the child” standard must never be applied to condemn a
parenting choice, at least when the parents are not found to be unfit and
where parents are in agreement with each other over the parenting
decision. Courts should recognize those parents’ constitutional rights
and powers and give a large measure of deference to parents’
prerogatives in deciding how to raise their children—akin to the
business judgment of corporate directors. At the same time, states
should take care to ensure that parents’ procedural rights are protected,
primarily through affording a right to counsel early in the proceedings.
Second-guessing by the state will otherwise undermine the family, and
ultimately harm the children.
Free-range parenting, like any theory of parenting, may or may not
withstand the test of time or survive in the marketplace of ideas. 263 But
unless parents are allowed to trust their own judgment on these issues,
to make these decisions without fear of state intervention, the
they were going to take the other one away. If she refused to choose, they would take both
children. SOPHIE’S CHOICE (Incorporated Television Company & Keith Barish Productions
1982).
263 Robert Putnam, in his article Still Bowling Alone, suggests that the sense of community
may be making a comeback in the post-9/11 era. The rise of the free-range parenting movement
also suggests the start of a backswing of the pendulum. Sander & Putnam, supra note 32.
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marketplace of ideas, as applied to parenting, will be effectively shut
down. Then only one type of parenting—state-approved overprotective
parenting—will be permitted: parents can either conform to the stateapproved approach or risk the heavy-handed retribution from state
authorities. That situation is the natural consequence if the state
undervalues parental rights and prerogatives and applies instead a de
facto “best interest” standard to justify interventions in families.
The alternative, more consistent with American constitutional
values, is to strengthen and safeguard the family from external secondguessing. The Fourteenth Amendment protections should be sufficient
to do this, as any action by the state in derogation of a parent’s rights
should be subjected to strict scrutiny and struck down unless it is the
“least restrictive means” of protecting that child from genuine harm. But
it may also be helpful to think in terms of a “parental judgment rule”
modeled on the law of fiduciaries or other protections for parental
discretion. Finally, parents need representation, lest they waive their
rights to parent as they see fit in a desperate but understandable effort to
keep custody of their own children. States need to provide parents with
counsel and to advise them of this right, at the outset, certainly in time
for parents to be represented at the first removal hearing. Otherwise, the
parents’ constitutional rights will remain unasserted, unadjudicated, and
unrecognized.
If the state authorities and the courts are going to get this right,
they need to respect parents’ constitutional liberty interests and
approach any intervention in the family knowing that their actions are
subject to strict scrutiny. State interventions in the family should be
viewed with skepticism, as they violate the “sanctity of the family” 264 and
threaten “the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children . . . perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by [the Supreme Court].” 265 Only if strict scrutiny is applied
to such intervention can parents get the breathing space, i.e., the
discretion, they need to parent as they see fit, and to do it without fear).
By strengthening the family, the state’s legitimate objectives to promote
the welfare of children are better served; after all, the ultimate
beneficiaries of these constitutional guarantees are not so much the
parents but the children themselves.

Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 720 (1997) (“In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause
includes the rights to . . . direct the education and upbringing of one’s children . . . .”).
264
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